Google (yourusername) MCP Server
google-mcp-server
npm
v1.0.0
Published by yourusername — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Google Suite MCP Server for Cursor and other MCP clients
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 7.5 = 93. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 93 − 11 = 82. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/google-mcp-server.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/google-mcp-server.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const path = require('path'); const fs = require('fs'); // Get the directo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/google-mcp-server.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`index.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require('child_process'); // Get the path to the binary script const scriptPath = path.join(__dirname
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server index.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (bin/google-mcp-server.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`bin/google-mcp-server.js:17`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: equire('child_process').execSync(`${cmd} --version`, { encoding: 'utf8' }); if (result) {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/google-mcp-server.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (bin/setup.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`bin/setup.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const path = require('path'); const fs = require('fs'); const readline = req
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/setup.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"google-mcp-server" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: python -m pip install -r requirements.txt
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package google-mcp-server
Tools 26
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
download_drive_fileingests untrusted inputlist_drive_filesreads sensitive dataappend_to_spreadsheetno sensitive capabilitycreate_calendarno sensitive capabilitycreate_drive_fileno sensitive capabilitycreate_drive_folderno sensitive capabilitycreate_eventno sensitive capabilitycreate_spreadsheetno sensitive capabilitydelete_calendarno sensitive capabilitydelete_drive_fileno sensitive capability
Show 16 more tools ↓
delete_eventno sensitive capabilityformat_spreadsheet_cellsno sensitive capabilityget_calendarno sensitive capabilityget_drive_fileno sensitive capabilityget_eventno sensitive capabilityget_free_busyno sensitive capabilityget_spreadsheet_infono sensitive capabilitylist_calendarsno sensitive capabilitylist_eventsno sensitive capabilityread_spreadsheet_rangeno sensitive capabilitysearch_drive_filesno sensitive capabilitysearch_eventsno sensitive capabilityshare_drive_fileno sensitive capabilityupdate_drive_fileno sensitive capabilityupdate_eventno sensitive capabilitywrite_spreadsheet_rangeno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (26 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.0 latest |
B 82/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan google-mcp-server --onlineOther implementations of Google 7
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 8 side by side →
Google MCP tools for calendar, drive, gmail etc...
Production-grade MCP server for Google Workspace - Gmail, Calendar, Sheets, Docs, and Drive integration
The ONLY comprehensive MCP server for Google Workspace - Calendar, Contacts, and Gmail management in Claude, Cursor, Windsurf
A starter template for building MCP (Model Context Protocol) servers
MCP server for multi-Google-account access (Gmail, Calendar, Drive) [BETA - Google OAuth approval pending, by-invite access]
Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Google Workspace - Calendar, Gmail, Drive, Docs, Sheets, Slides, Meet, Chat, Forms, YouTube, Tasks, and Contacts with OAuth 2.0 authentication
More in Communication & Collaboration
One key, 100+ models — chat with any LLM and generate video, images, speech. Free trial at 370.ai.
Retired compatibility stub for the AgentCanary MCP server. Daily briefs continue on X and Telegram.
A Backstage plugin that provides a chat interface for interacting with the MCP Servers.
Signal-first Bitcoin intelligence: sovereign, hiring & hashrate signals over MCP.
WhatsApp® reminders and rescheduling for Calendly. Public read-only MCP endpoint.
Open Source Generic MCP Client for testing & evaluating mcp servers and agents