Google (r-mcp) MCP Server
@r-mcp/google-mcp
npm
v1.0.1
Published by @r-mcp — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
A starter template for building MCP (Model Context Protocol) servers
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 5 = 95. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([gmail-read-emails]) co-exist with external-action tools ([gmail-send-email]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [gmail-read-emails] → sinks [gmail-send-email]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow gmail-read-emails → gmail-send-email
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/finance.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/finance.js:11`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await axios.get(`https://api.search.brave.com/res/v1/news/search?q=${encodeURIComponent(query)}&count=
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/finance.js
Tools 18
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
gmail-read-emailsingests untrusted inputgmail-send-emailnetwork egressairports-searchno sensitive capabilitycalendar-create-eventno sensitive capabilitycalendar-delete-eventno sensitive capabilitycalendar-get-eventno sensitive capabilitycalendar-list-calendarsno sensitive capabilitycalendar-list-eventsno sensitive capabilitycalendar-update-eventno sensitive capabilitydistance-matrixno sensitive capability
Show 8 more tools ↓
finance-searchno sensitive capabilitygeocodeno sensitive capabilityget-directionsno sensitive capabilitygmail-get-emailno sensitive capabilitygmail-get-labelsno sensitive capabilityplace-detailsno sensitive capabilityplaces-searchno sensitive capabilityreverse-geocodeno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (18 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.1 latest |
A 95/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @r-mcp/google-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Google 7
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 8 side by side →
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