Google (procedure-tech) MCP Server
@procedure-tech/mcp-google
npm
v0.9.0
Source verified
Published by bkbaheti — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for multi-Google-account access (Gmail, Calendar, Drive) [BETA - Google OAuth approval pending, by-invite access]
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: drive_download_file → drive_list_files ⇒ drive_upload_file. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink — and at least one leg is a direct schema wire (⇒), where a producer's output drops straight into a free-text parameter of the next tool, so the chain needs little agent cooperation. Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow drive_download_file → drive_list_files → drive_upload_file
medium Tool "drive_move_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "drive_move_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "move_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool drive_move_file
low Mutating tool "drive_move_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "drive_move_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool drive_move_file
Tools 65
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
drive_list_shared_drivesingests untrusted inputreads sensitive datadrive_download_fileingests untrusted inputdrive_get_commentsingests untrusted inputdrive_get_file_contentingests untrusted inputdrive_get_full_file_contentingests untrusted inputdrive_list_filesreads sensitive datadrive_move_filewrites filesdrive_upload_filenetwork egressgmail_bulk_save_attachmentsingests untrusted inputgmail_get_attachmentingests untrusted input
Show 55 more tools ↓
gmail_get_messages_batchingests untrusted inputcalendar_create_eventno sensitive capabilitycalendar_delete_eventno sensitive capabilitycalendar_freebusyno sensitive capabilitycalendar_get_eventno sensitive capabilitycalendar_list_calendarsno sensitive capabilitycalendar_list_eventsno sensitive capabilitycalendar_move_eventno sensitive capabilitycalendar_rsvpno sensitive capabilitycalendar_search_eventsno sensitive capabilitycalendar_update_eventno sensitive capabilitydrive_copy_fileno sensitive capabilitydrive_create_folderno sensitive capabilitydrive_get_comment_repliesno sensitive capabilitydrive_get_fileno sensitive capabilitydrive_rename_fileno sensitive capabilitydrive_search_filesno sensitive capabilitydrive_share_fileno sensitive capabilitydrive_trash_fileno sensitive capabilitydrive_update_permissionsno sensitive capabilitygmail_archiveno sensitive capabilitygmail_batch_modify_labelsno sensitive capabilitygmail_create_draftno sensitive capabilitygmail_create_draft_with_attachmentno sensitive capabilitygmail_create_filterno sensitive capabilitygmail_create_labelno sensitive capabilitygmail_delete_draftno sensitive capabilitygmail_delete_filterno sensitive capabilitygmail_delete_labelno sensitive capabilitygmail_get_draftno sensitive capabilitygmail_get_messageno sensitive capabilitygmail_get_threadno sensitive capabilitygmail_get_vacationno sensitive capabilitygmail_list_attachmentsno sensitive capabilitygmail_list_filtersno sensitive capabilitygmail_list_labelsno sensitive capabilitygmail_mark_read_unreadno sensitive capabilitygmail_modify_labelsno sensitive capabilitygmail_reply_in_threadno sensitive capabilitygmail_search_messagesno sensitive capabilitygmail_send_draftno sensitive capabilitygmail_set_vacationno sensitive capabilitygmail_trashno sensitive capabilitygmail_untrashno sensitive capabilitygmail_update_draftno sensitive capabilitygmail_update_labelno sensitive capabilitygoogle_add_accountno sensitive capabilitygoogle_check_pending_authno sensitive capabilitygoogle_list_accountsno sensitive capabilitygoogle_reauth_accountno sensitive capabilitygoogle_remove_accountno sensitive capabilitygoogle_set_account_aliasno sensitive capabilitygoogle_set_account_descriptionno sensitive capabilitygoogle_set_account_labelsno sensitive capabilitygoogle_versionno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (65 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 5
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.9.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.8.0 |
A 94/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-05 |
v0.7.0 |
A 94/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v0.5.1 |
A 94/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-18 |
v0.4.3 |
A 94/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-13 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @procedure-tech/mcp-google --onlineOther implementations of Google 7
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 8 side by side →
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