Google (pegasusheavy) MCP Server

@pegasusheavy/google-mcp npm v1.0.2

Published by @pegasusheavy — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Google Workspace - Calendar, Gmail, Drive, Docs, Sheets, Slides, Meet, Chat, Forms, YouTube, Tasks, and Contacts with OAuth 2.0 authentication

Trust grade
A
93/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 93/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
Share this Trust Score
𝕏 Share LinkedIn Reddit
A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 93/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 5

critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002

This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: drive_download_file ⇒ drive_list_files ⇒ chat_send_message. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink — and at least one leg is a direct schema wire (⇒), where a producer's output drops straight into a free-text parameter of the next tool, so the chain needs little agent cooperation. Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.

Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.

Location: flow drive_download_file → drive_list_files → chat_send_message

medium Tool "drive_delete_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002

Tool "drive_delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.

Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.

Location: tool drive_delete_file

medium Tool "drive_move_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002

Tool "drive_move_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "move_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.

Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.

Location: tool drive_move_file

low Mutating tool "drive_delete_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "drive_delete_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool drive_delete_file

low Mutating tool "drive_move_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "drive_move_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool drive_move_file

Tools 130

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • chat_send_messagenetwork egress
  • drive_delete_filewrites files
  • drive_download_fileingests untrusted input
  • drive_list_filesreads sensitive data
  • drive_move_filewrites files
  • drive_upload_filenetwork egress
  • gmail_get_unreadingests untrusted input
  • Authentication Statusno sensitive capability
  • calendar_create_eventno sensitive capability
  • calendar_delete_eventno sensitive capability
Show 120 more tools ↓
  • calendar_getno sensitive capability
  • calendar_get_eventno sensitive capability
  • calendar_get_freebusyno sensitive capability
  • calendar_listno sensitive capability
  • calendar_list_eventsno sensitive capability
  • calendar_quick_addno sensitive capability
  • calendar_todayno sensitive capability
  • calendar_upcomingno sensitive capability
  • calendar_update_eventno sensitive capability
  • chat_add_memberno sensitive capability
  • chat_add_reactionno sensitive capability
  • chat_create_spaceno sensitive capability
  • chat_delete_messageno sensitive capability
  • chat_delete_spaceno sensitive capability
  • chat_get_messageno sensitive capability
  • chat_get_spaceno sensitive capability
  • chat_list_membersno sensitive capability
  • chat_list_messagesno sensitive capability
  • chat_list_spacesno sensitive capability
  • chat_remove_memberno sensitive capability
  • chat_update_messageno sensitive capability
  • contacts_createno sensitive capability
  • contacts_deleteno sensitive capability
  • contacts_getno sensitive capability
  • contacts_listno sensitive capability
  • contacts_list_groupsno sensitive capability
  • contacts_searchno sensitive capability
  • Credentials Pathno sensitive capability
  • docs_append_textno sensitive capability
  • docs_createno sensitive capability
  • docs_insert_textno sensitive capability
  • docs_listno sensitive capability
  • docs_readno sensitive capability
  • docs_replace_textno sensitive capability
  • drive_copy_fileno sensitive capability
  • drive_create_folderno sensitive capability
  • drive_get_fileno sensitive capability
  • drive_rename_fileno sensitive capability
  • drive_searchno sensitive capability
  • forms_add_imageno sensitive capability
  • forms_add_page_breakno sensitive capability
  • forms_add_questionno sensitive capability
  • forms_add_textno sensitive capability
  • forms_add_videono sensitive capability
  • forms_createno sensitive capability
  • forms_delete_itemno sensitive capability
  • forms_getno sensitive capability
  • forms_get_responseno sensitive capability
  • forms_list_responsesno sensitive capability
  • forms_update_infono sensitive capability
  • gmail_get_messageno sensitive capability
  • gmail_get_profileno sensitive capability
  • gmail_get_threadno sensitive capability
  • gmail_list_labelsno sensitive capability
  • gmail_list_messagesno sensitive capability
  • gmail_mark_readno sensitive capability
  • gmail_mark_unreadno sensitive capability
  • gmail_replyno sensitive capability
  • gmail_searchno sensitive capability
  • gmail_sendno sensitive capability
  • gmail_trashno sensitive capability
  • google_authno sensitive capability
  • google_auth_codeno sensitive capability
  • google_auth_statusno sensitive capability
  • google_logoutno sensitive capability
  • meet_create_instantno sensitive capability
  • meet_create_spaceno sensitive capability
  • meet_end_conferenceno sensitive capability
  • meet_get_by_eventno sensitive capability
  • meet_get_conference_recordno sensitive capability
  • meet_get_recordingno sensitive capability
  • meet_get_spaceno sensitive capability
  • meet_get_transcriptno sensitive capability
  • meet_list_conference_recordsno sensitive capability
  • meet_list_participantsno sensitive capability
  • meet_list_recordingsno sensitive capability
  • meet_list_transcript_entriesno sensitive capability
  • meet_list_transcriptsno sensitive capability
  • meet_list_upcomingno sensitive capability
  • meet_scheduleno sensitive capability
  • notes_createno sensitive capability
  • notes_deleteno sensitive capability
  • notes_listno sensitive capability
  • notes_updateno sensitive capability
  • sheets_add_sheetno sensitive capability
  • sheets_appendno sensitive capability
  • sheets_clearno sensitive capability
  • sheets_createno sensitive capability
  • sheets_delete_sheetno sensitive capability
  • sheets_getno sensitive capability
  • sheets_listno sensitive capability
  • sheets_readno sensitive capability
  • sheets_updateno sensitive capability
  • slides_add_imageno sensitive capability
  • slides_add_slideno sensitive capability
  • slides_add_textno sensitive capability
  • slides_createno sensitive capability
  • slides_delete_slideno sensitive capability
  • slides_duplicate_slideno sensitive capability
  • slides_getno sensitive capability
  • slides_listno sensitive capability
  • slides_replace_textno sensitive capability
  • tasks_complete_taskno sensitive capability
  • tasks_create_taskno sensitive capability
  • tasks_create_tasklistno sensitive capability
  • tasks_delete_taskno sensitive capability
  • tasks_delete_tasklistno sensitive capability
  • tasks_list_tasklistsno sensitive capability
  • tasks_list_tasksno sensitive capability
  • tasks_update_taskno sensitive capability
  • youtube_get_channelno sensitive capability
  • youtube_get_my_channelno sensitive capability
  • youtube_get_playlist_itemsno sensitive capability
  • youtube_get_videono sensitive capability
  • youtube_get_video_commentsno sensitive capability
  • youtube_list_liked_videosno sensitive capability
  • youtube_list_playlistsno sensitive capability
  • youtube_list_subscriptionsno sensitive capability
  • youtube_rate_videono sensitive capability
  • youtube_searchno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.0.2 latest A 93/100 5 1.13.0 2026-09-07

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 93/100
Markdown (GitHub README)
[![MCP Trust Score](https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/pegasusheavy-google-mcp/badge.svg)](https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/pegasusheavy-google-mcp)
HTML
<a href="https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/pegasusheavy-google-mcp"><img src="https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/pegasusheavy-google-mcp/badge.svg" alt="MCP Trust Score" height="20"></a>
Prefer shields.io styling? Point it at https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/pegasusheavy-google-mcp/badge.json via https://img.shields.io/endpoint?url=…

Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan @pegasusheavy/google-mcp --online

Use the free API → How scoring works

Other implementations of Google 7

Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 8 side by side →

More in Productivity & Workflow