Vmware MCP Server
vmware-mcp
npm
v0.2.0
Published by havu0 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for controlling VMware Fusion/Workstation VMs via vmrun CLI
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 11
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([guest_read_file]) and tools that can send data out ([guest_run_command]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [guest_read_file] → sinks [guest_run_command]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow guest_read_file → guest_run_command
high Tool "guest_run_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "guest_run_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "run_command" in tool name, parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool guest_run_command
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/config.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/config.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { homedir } from 'node:os'; import { join } from 'node:path'; const DEFAU
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/config.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/vmrun.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/vmrun.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { readFile, unlink } from 'node:fs/promises'; import { randomUUID } from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/vmrun.js
medium Tool "guest_delete_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "guest_delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool guest_delete_file
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "guest_run_command"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "guest_run_command" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool guest_run_command · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "shell" on "guest_run_command"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "guest_run_command" takes a command-shaped parameter "shell" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool guest_run_command · inputSchema.properties.shell
low Mutating tool "guest_run_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "guest_run_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool guest_run_command
low Mutating tool "guest_delete_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "guest_delete_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool guest_delete_file
low Unconstrained path parameter "guest_path" on "guest_read_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "guest_read_file" takes a path parameter "guest_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool guest_read_file · inputSchema.properties.guest_path
low Unconstrained path parameter "guest_path" on "guest_delete_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "guest_delete_file" takes a path parameter "guest_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool guest_delete_file · inputSchema.properties.guest_path
Tools 32
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
guest_delete_filewrites filesguest_read_filereads sensitive dataguest_run_commandruns code / shellfile_copy_from_guestno sensitive capabilityfile_copy_to_guestno sensitive capabilityguest_create_tempfileno sensitive capabilityguest_directory_createno sensitive capabilityguest_directory_existsno sensitive capabilityguest_file_existsno sensitive capabilityguest_kill_processno sensitive capability
Show 22 more tools ↓
guest_list_directoryno sensitive capabilityguest_process_listno sensitive capabilityguest_rename_fileno sensitive capabilityguest_run_programno sensitive capabilityguest_type_keystrokesno sensitive capabilityvm_capture_screenno sensitive capabilityvm_check_toolsno sensitive capabilityvm_get_ipno sensitive capabilityvm_listno sensitive capabilityvm_pauseno sensitive capabilityvm_read_variableno sensitive capabilityvm_resetno sensitive capabilityvm_snapshot_createno sensitive capabilityvm_snapshot_deleteno sensitive capabilityvm_snapshot_listno sensitive capabilityvm_snapshot_revertno sensitive capabilityvm_startno sensitive capabilityvm_statusno sensitive capabilityvm_stopno sensitive capabilityvm_suspendno sensitive capabilityvm_unpauseno sensitive capabilityvm_write_variableno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (32 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 11 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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