Adapters (frontmcp) MCP Server
@frontmcp/adapters
npm
v1.5.5
Source verified
Published by agentfront — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Every server starts at 100. These are the exact deductions the deterministic engine applied — each one reproducible, none of it an opinion or an LLM's guess:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −9.5 | Unsafe deserialization ×2 MTC-SRC-007 | permissions |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind the deduction.
Findings 6
high Dynamic code execution in server code (esm/skills/index.mjs)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`esm/skills/index.mjs:757`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: new Function(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server esm/skills/index.mjs
high Dynamic code execution in server code (skills/index.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`skills/index.js:855`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: new Function(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server skills/index.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (esm/skills/index.mjs)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`esm/skills/index.mjs:757`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import(s)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server esm/skills/index.mjs
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (skills/index.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`skills/index.js:855`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import(s)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server skills/index.js
medium Unsafe deserialization (esm/skills/index.mjs)MTC-SRC-007
In the server's implementation (`esm/skills/index.mjs:165`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: yaml.load(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server esm/skills/index.mjs
medium Unsafe deserialization (skills/index.js)MTC-SRC-007
In the server's implementation (`skills/index.js:263`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: yaml.load(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server skills/index.js
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.5.5 latest |
A 91/100 | 6 | 1.5.0 | 2026-07-22 |
Embed this score
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Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @frontmcp/adapters --onlineOther implementations of Adapters 1
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