Vmware — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "vmware-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "vmware-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "vmware-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can create, modify or delete files",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec",
"sensitive-source",
"file-write"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (32 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-004",
"title": "Sensitive-source and external-sink co-exist",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tools that read sensitive data ([guest_read_file]) and tools that can send data out ([guest_run_command]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.",
"remediation": "Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "guest_read_file → guest_run_command"
},
"evidence": "sources [guest_read_file] → sinks [guest_run_command]",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"sources": [
"guest_read_file"
],
"sinks": [
"guest_run_command"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"guest_run_command\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"guest_run_command\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"run_command\" in tool name, parameter \"command\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "guest_run_command"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/config.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/config.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/config.js"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { homedir } from 'node:os'; import { join } from 'node:path'; const DEFAU",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/config.js",
"line": 3,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/vmrun.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/vmrun.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/vmrun.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { readFile, unlink } from 'node:fs/promises'; import { randomUUID } from",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/vmrun.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"guest_delete_file\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"guest_delete_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"delete_file\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "guest_delete_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"command\" on \"guest_run_command\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"guest_run_command\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"command\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "guest_run_command",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.command"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "command"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"shell\" on \"guest_run_command\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"guest_run_command\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"shell\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "guest_run_command",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.shell"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "shell"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"guest_run_command\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"guest_run_command\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "guest_run_command"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"guest_delete_file\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"guest_delete_file\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "guest_delete_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"guest_path\" on \"guest_read_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"guest_read_file\" takes a path parameter \"guest_path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "guest_read_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.guest_path"
},
"data": {
"param": "guest_path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"guest_path\" on \"guest_delete_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"guest_delete_file\" takes a path parameter \"guest_path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "guest_delete_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.guest_path"
},
"data": {
"param": "guest_path"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [],
"sensitiveSource": [
"guest_read_file"
],
"externalSink": [
"guest_run_command"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"guest_read_file",
"guest_run_command"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A sensitive-source → external-sink chain exists: guest_read_file → guest_run_command."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "guest_run_command",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"run_command\" in tool name",
"parameter \"command\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "guest_run_program",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "file_copy_to_guest",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "file_copy_from_guest",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "guest_read_file",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "guest_file_exists",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "guest_directory_exists",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "guest_directory_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "guest_delete_file",
"tags": [
"file-write"
],
"reasons": {
"file-write": [
"keyword \"delete_file\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "guest_rename_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "guest_list_directory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "guest_create_tempfile",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vm_start",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vm_stop",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vm_suspend",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vm_reset",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vm_pause",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vm_unpause",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vm_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vm_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vm_get_ip",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "guest_process_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "guest_kill_process",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vm_capture_screen",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "guest_type_keystrokes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vm_snapshot_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vm_snapshot_revert",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vm_snapshot_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vm_snapshot_delete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vm_read_variable",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vm_write_variable",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vm_check_tools",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "fe25eb1d984cb5a676021f07721aa22af0bc2a0d4ca1a146ed6521aca8749c10",
"stats": {
"tools": 32,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 4,
"medium": 3,
"low": 4,
"info": 0
}
}
}