Purmemo — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "purmemo-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "purmemo-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "purmemo-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 99,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 1.2,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (44 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/auth/universal-auth.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/auth/universal-auth.js:206`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/auth/universal-auth.js"
},
"evidence": "path.join(os.homedir(), '.npmrc') }, { name: 'Environment', env: 'PURMEMO_API_KEY' }, { name: 'V",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "dist/auth/universal-auth.js",
"line": 206,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/auth/oauth-manager.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/auth/oauth-manager.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/auth/oauth-manager.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execFile } from 'child_process'; import * as os from 'os'; import TokenStore from './token-store.js'; function es",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/auth/oauth-manager.js",
"line": 9,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/auth/universal-auth.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/auth/universal-auth.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/auth/universal-auth.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execFile } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile); cla",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/auth/universal-auth.js",
"line": 11,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/hooks/purmemo_lib.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/hooks/purmemo_lib.js:670`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/hooks/purmemo_lib.js"
},
"evidence": "} = await import('node:child_process'); const child = spawn('npx', ['-y', 'purmemo-mcp@latest', '--update'], {",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/hooks/purmemo_lib.js",
"line": 670,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/server.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/server.js:50`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/server.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import path from 'path'; import fs from 'fs'; import os from 'os'; // Route subc",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/server.js",
"line": 50,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/server.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/server.js:81`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/server.js"
},
"evidence": "rname, 'setup.js'); import(setupPath).catch(err => { console.error(err); process.exit(1); }); // setup.js manage",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "dist/server.js",
"line": 81,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (dist/setup.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/setup.js:331`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/setup.js"
},
"evidence": "const res = await fetch('https://registry.npmjs.org/purmemo-mcp/latest'); spinner.stop(); if (!res",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/setup.js",
"line": 331,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/setup.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/setup.js:18`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/setup.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import TokenStore from './auth/token-store.js'; import { getActiveTokenFile, get",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/setup.js",
"line": 18,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
"title": "Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "\"purmemo-mcp\" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.",
"remediation": "Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "purmemo-mcp"
},
"evidence": "node -e \"console.log('\\\\n🧠 pūrmemo MCP ready! Run: npx purmemo-mcp init\\\\n')\"",
"owasp": "LLM03:2025 Supply Chain",
"references": [
"https://github.com/ossf/package-analysis",
"https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/"
],
"data": {
"scripts": [
"postinstall"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "save_artifact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "commit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "snapshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "snapshot_sources",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "save_snapshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_snapshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "accept_snapshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "recall_memories",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_clusters",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"browse\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_memory_details",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "discover_related_conversations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_user_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "run_workflow",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"read_pr\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_workflows",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "share_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "recall_public",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_public_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "report_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_acknowledged_errors",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "save_investigation_result",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"search web\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "generate_handoff_brief",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "save_test_result",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_test_results",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_artifacts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_investigations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_next_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "complete_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Who I Am",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "My Recent Work Context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "My Active Projects",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Memory Vault Stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Recall Widget",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Save Widget",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Memory Detail Widget",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Context Widget",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Discover Widget",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Specific Memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "load-context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "topic",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "save-this-conversation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "note",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "catch-me-up",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "project",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "weekly-review",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "f482d944c1d28f9a6965e83965d1627c05a8ce26624c4c87c53500604417e485",
"stats": {
"tools": 44,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 5,
"medium": 1,
"low": 3,
"info": 0
}
}
}