Purmemo MCP Server
purmemo-mcp
npm
v15.7.26
Source verified
Published by purmemo-ai — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for pūrmemo - AI conversation memory that works everywhere. Save and recall conversations across Claude Desktop, Cursor, and other MCP-compatible platforms. Intelligent context extraction, smart titles, living documents.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 6 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 9
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/auth/universal-auth.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`dist/auth/universal-auth.js:206`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: path.join(os.homedir(), '.npmrc') }, { name: 'Environment', env: 'PURMEMO_API_KEY' }, { name: 'V
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/auth/universal-auth.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/auth/oauth-manager.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/auth/oauth-manager.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execFile } from 'child_process'; import * as os from 'os'; import TokenStore from './token-store.js'; function es
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/auth/oauth-manager.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/auth/universal-auth.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/auth/universal-auth.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execFile } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile); cla
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/auth/universal-auth.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/hooks/purmemo_lib.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/hooks/purmemo_lib.js:670`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: } = await import('node:child_process'); const child = spawn('npx', ['-y', 'purmemo-mcp@latest', '--update'], {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/hooks/purmemo_lib.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/server.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/server.js:50`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import path from 'path'; import fs from 'fs'; import os from 'os'; // Route subc
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/server.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/server.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/server.js:81`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rname, 'setup.js'); import(setupPath).catch(err => { console.error(err); process.exit(1); }); // setup.js manage
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/server.js
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (dist/setup.js)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/setup.js:331`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res = await fetch('https://registry.npmjs.org/purmemo-mcp/latest'); spinner.stop(); if (!res
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/setup.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/setup.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/setup.js:18`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import TokenStore from './auth/token-store.js'; import { getActiveTokenFile, get
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/setup.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"purmemo-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node -e "console.log('\\n🧠 pūrmemo MCP ready! Run: npx purmemo-mcp init\\n')"
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package purmemo-mcp
Tools 44
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_acknowledged_errorsingests untrusted inputlist_clustersingests untrusted inputrun_workflowingests untrusted inputsave_investigation_resultingests untrusted inputsnapshot_sourcesingests untrusted inputaccept_snapshotno sensitive capabilitycatch-me-upno sensitive capabilitycommitno sensitive capabilitycomplete_taskno sensitive capabilityContext Widgetno sensitive capability
Show 34 more tools ↓
Discover Widgetno sensitive capabilitydiscover_related_conversationsno sensitive capabilitygenerate_handoff_briefno sensitive capabilityget_artifactsno sensitive capabilityget_investigationsno sensitive capabilityget_memory_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_next_taskno sensitive capabilityget_public_memoryno sensitive capabilityget_snapshotno sensitive capabilityget_test_resultsno sensitive capabilityget_user_contextno sensitive capabilitylist_workflowsno sensitive capabilityload-contextno sensitive capabilityMemory Detail Widgetno sensitive capabilityMemory Vault Statsno sensitive capabilityMy Active Projectsno sensitive capabilityMy Recent Work Contextno sensitive capabilitynoteno sensitive capabilityprojectno sensitive capabilityRecall Widgetno sensitive capabilityrecall_memoriesno sensitive capabilityrecall_publicno sensitive capabilityreport_memoryno sensitive capabilitySave Widgetno sensitive capabilitysave_artifactno sensitive capabilitysave_snapshotno sensitive capabilitysave_test_resultno sensitive capabilitysave-this-conversationno sensitive capabilityshare_memoryno sensitive capabilitysnapshotno sensitive capabilitySpecific Memoryno sensitive capabilitytopicno sensitive capabilityweekly-reviewno sensitive capabilityWho I Amno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (44 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v15.7.26 latest |
A 93/100 | 9 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v15.7.25 |
A 93/100 | 9 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-03 |
v15.7.24 |
A 93/100 | 9 | 1.10.0 | 2026-07-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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