Nexo Brain — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "nexo-brain",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "nexo-brain"
},
"server": {
"name": "nexo-brain"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 86,
"threatScore": 93,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 6.3,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 1.2,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (170 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/local_context/privacy.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/local_context/privacy.py:10`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/local_context/privacy.py"
},
"evidence": "\".env.production\", \".npmrc\", \".pypirc\", \".netrc\", \".boto\", \".pgpass\", \".my.cnf\", \".git-cred",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "src/local_context/privacy.py",
"line": 10,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/r23g_secrets_in_output.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/r23g_secrets_in_output.py:34`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/r23g_secrets_in_output.py"
},
"evidence": "]*\" r\"(?:[/\\w.-]*(?:id_rsa|\\.pem|\\.p12|\\.pfx|\\.crt\\.key|credentials(?:\\.json)?|secrets?\\.(?:json|yaml|env))\" r\"|",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "src/r23g_secrets_in_output.py",
"line": 34,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (bin/nexo-brain.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/nexo-brain.js:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/nexo-brain.js"
},
"evidence": "spawnSync } = require(\"child_process\"); const crypto = require(\"crypto\"); const fs = require(\"fs\"); const { createRequi",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bin/nexo-brain.js",
"line": 17,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (bin/nexo-managed-mcp.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/nexo-managed-mcp.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/nexo-managed-mcp.js"
},
"evidence": "st { spawn } = require(\"child_process\"); function nexoHome() { return process.env.NEXO_HOME || path.join(require(\"os\"",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bin/nexo-managed-mcp.js",
"line": 6,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (bin/nexo.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/nexo.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/nexo.js"
},
"evidence": "spawnSync } = require(\"child_process\"); const fs = require(\"fs\"); const os = require(\"os\"); const path = require(\"path\"",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bin/nexo.js",
"line": 10,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (bin/windows-wsl-bridge.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/windows-wsl-bridge.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/windows-wsl-bridge.js"
},
"evidence": "spawnSync } = require(\"child_process\"); const fs = require(\"fs\"); const os = require(\"os\"); const path = require(\"path\"",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bin/windows-wsl-bridge.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/agent_runner.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/agent_runner.py:856`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/agent_runner.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run(cmd, env=launch_env, cwd=str(cwd_path)) finally: duration_ms = int((t",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/agent_runner.py",
"line": 856,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/auto_update.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/auto_update.py:605`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/auto_update.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( [\"git\", \"rev-parse\", \"--is-inside-work-tree\"], cwd=str(R",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/auto_update.py",
"line": 605,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/backup_retention.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/backup_retention.py:42`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/backup_retention.py"
},
"evidence": "-technical\") proc = subprocess.run(command, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=120) try: payload =",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/backup_retention.py",
"line": 42,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/causal_graph.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/causal_graph.py:200`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/causal_graph.py"
},
"evidence": "eturn True result = subprocess.run( [\"git\", \"cat-file\", \"-e\", f\"{clean}^{{commit}}\"], cwd=repo_root,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/causal_graph.py",
"line": 200,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/cli.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/cli.py:138`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/cli.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( [\"npm\", \"view\", LATEST_NPM_PACKAGE, \"version\"], capture_",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/cli.py",
"line": 138,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (bin/nexo-brain.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/nexo-brain.js:2967`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/nexo-brain.js"
},
"evidence": "t); try { execSync( `launchctl bootout gui/$(id -u) \"${plistPath}\" 2>/dev/null; launchctl bootst",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "bin/nexo-brain.js",
"line": 2967,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/auto_update.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/auto_update.py:1184`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/auto_update.py"
},
"evidence": "y: module = __import__(module_name) except Exception: missing.append(state_key)",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "src/auto_update.py",
"line": 1184,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/classifier_local.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/classifier_local.py:58`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/classifier_local.py"
},
"evidence": "try: __import__(module_name) except Exception: return False return True def",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "src/classifier_local.py",
"line": 58,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (bin/postinstall.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`bin/postinstall.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/postinstall.js"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } = require(\"child_process\"); const NEXO_HOME = process.env.NEXO_HOME || path.join(require(\"os\").homedir(),",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bin/postinstall.js",
"line": 11,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
"title": "Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "\"nexo-brain\" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.",
"remediation": "Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "nexo-brain"
},
"evidence": "node bin/postinstall.js",
"owasp": "LLM03:2025 Supply Chain",
"references": [
"https://github.com/ossf/package-analysis",
"https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/"
],
"data": {
"scripts": [
"postinstall"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "nexo_startup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_heartbeat",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_session_diary_read",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_session_diary_write",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_session_compliance_state",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_confidence_check",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_protocol_debt_resolve",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_card_match",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_skill_match",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_stop",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_cortex_check",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_cortex_decide",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_guard_check",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_task_open",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_task_acknowledge_guard",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_task_close",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_workflow_open",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_workflow_update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_goal_open",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_goal_update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_goal_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_goal_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_workflow_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_workflow_handoff",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_workflow_compensation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_workflow_resume",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_workflow_replay",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_workflow_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_runtime_service_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_mcp_write_queue_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_managed_mcp_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_closure_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_closure_next",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_closure_item_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_closure_triage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_closure_link",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_closure_snapshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_closure_verify",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_closure_close",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_opportunity_refresh",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_opportunity_queue",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_opportunity_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_opportunity_feedback",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_opportunity_suppress",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_local_index_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_local_index_control",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_local_index_roots",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_local_index_exclusions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_local_index_filetypes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nexo_local_index_migrate_roots_v2",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
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