Nexo Brain MCP Server
nexo-brain
npm
v7.38.7
Published by wazionapps — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
NEXO runtime core for NEXO Desktop. Provides local memory, Deep Sleep, Evolution support-ticket mode, skills, watchdog, and MCP tooling for the Desktop product.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 7.5 = 93. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 93 − 7 = 86. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 16
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/local_context/privacy.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`src/local_context/privacy.py:10`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ".env.production", ".npmrc", ".pypirc", ".netrc", ".boto", ".pgpass", ".my.cnf", ".git-cred
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/local_context/privacy.py
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/r23g_secrets_in_output.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`src/r23g_secrets_in_output.py:34`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ]*" r"(?:[/\w.-]*(?:id_rsa|\.pem|\.p12|\.pfx|\.crt\.key|credentials(?:\.json)?|secrets?\.(?:json|yaml|env))" r"|
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/r23g_secrets_in_output.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/nexo-brain.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/nexo-brain.js:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } = require("child_process"); const crypto = require("crypto"); const fs = require("fs"); const { createRequi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/nexo-brain.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/nexo-managed-mcp.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/nexo-managed-mcp.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require("child_process"); function nexoHome() { return process.env.NEXO_HOME || path.join(require("os"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/nexo-managed-mcp.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/nexo.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/nexo.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } = require("child_process"); const fs = require("fs"); const os = require("os"); const path = require("path"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/nexo.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/windows-wsl-bridge.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/windows-wsl-bridge.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } = require("child_process"); const fs = require("fs"); const os = require("os"); const path = require("path"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/windows-wsl-bridge.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/agent_runner.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/agent_runner.py:856`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run(cmd, env=launch_env, cwd=str(cwd_path)) finally: duration_ms = int((t
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/agent_runner.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/auto_update.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/auto_update.py:605`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["git", "rev-parse", "--is-inside-work-tree"], cwd=str(R
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/auto_update.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/backup_retention.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/backup_retention.py:42`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: -technical") proc = subprocess.run(command, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=120) try: payload =
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/backup_retention.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/causal_graph.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/causal_graph.py:200`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eturn True result = subprocess.run( ["git", "cat-file", "-e", f"{clean}^{{commit}}"], cwd=repo_root,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/causal_graph.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/cli.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/cli.py:138`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["npm", "view", LATEST_NPM_PACKAGE, "version"], capture_
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cli.py
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (bin/nexo-brain.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`bin/nexo-brain.js:2967`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: t); try { execSync( `launchctl bootout gui/$(id -u) "${plistPath}" 2>/dev/null; launchctl bootst
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/nexo-brain.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/auto_update.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`src/auto_update.py:1184`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y: module = __import__(module_name) except Exception: missing.append(state_key)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/auto_update.py
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/classifier_local.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`src/classifier_local.py:58`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: __import__(module_name) except Exception: return False return True def
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/classifier_local.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (bin/postinstall.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`bin/postinstall.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } = require("child_process"); const NEXO_HOME = process.env.NEXO_HOME || path.join(require("os").homedir(),
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/postinstall.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"nexo-brain" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node bin/postinstall.js
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package nexo-brain
Tools 170
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
nexo_answerno sensitive capabilitynexo_api_callno sensitive capabilitynexo_askno sensitive capabilitynexo_automation_reconcileno sensitive capabilitynexo_automation_supervisorno sensitive capabilitynexo_capability_explainno sensitive capabilitynexo_card_matchno sensitive capabilitynexo_check_answerno sensitive capabilitynexo_checkpoint_readno sensitive capabilitynexo_checkpoint_saveno sensitive capability
Show 160 more tools ↓
nexo_closure_closeno sensitive capabilitynexo_closure_item_getno sensitive capabilitynexo_closure_linkno sensitive capabilitynexo_closure_nextno sensitive capabilitynexo_closure_snapshotno sensitive capabilitynexo_closure_statusno sensitive capabilitynexo_closure_triageno sensitive capabilitynexo_closure_verifyno sensitive capabilitynexo_cognitive_control_observatoryno sensitive capabilitynexo_confidence_checkno sensitive capabilitynexo_context_packetno sensitive capabilitynexo_context_routerno sensitive capabilitynexo_continuity_auditno sensitive capabilitynexo_continuity_compaction_eventno sensitive capabilitynexo_continuity_resume_bundleno sensitive capabilitynexo_continuity_snapshot_readno sensitive capabilitynexo_continuity_snapshot_writeno sensitive capabilitynexo_cortex_checkno sensitive capabilitynexo_cortex_decideno sensitive capabilitynexo_create_app_tokenno sensitive capabilitynexo_credential_createno sensitive capabilitynexo_credential_deleteno sensitive capabilitynexo_credential_getno sensitive capabilitynexo_credential_listno sensitive capabilitynexo_credential_updateno sensitive capabilitynexo_drive_actno sensitive capabilitynexo_drive_dismissno sensitive capabilitynexo_drive_reinforceno sensitive capabilitynexo_drive_signalsno sensitive capabilitynexo_embedding_migration_statusno sensitive capabilitynexo_entity_dossierno sensitive capabilitynexo_evidence_recordno sensitive capabilitynexo_evidence_searchno sensitive capabilitynexo_filesno sensitive capabilitynexo_followup_completeno sensitive capabilitynexo_followup_createno sensitive capabilitynexo_followup_deleteno sensitive capabilitynexo_followup_getno sensitive capabilitynexo_followup_lifecycleno sensitive capabilitynexo_followup_noteno sensitive capabilitynexo_followup_restoreno sensitive capabilitynexo_followup_updateno sensitive capabilitynexo_goal_getno sensitive capabilitynexo_goal_listno sensitive capabilitynexo_goal_openno sensitive capabilitynexo_goal_updateno sensitive capabilitynexo_guard_checkno sensitive capabilitynexo_guardian_rule_overrideno sensitive capabilitynexo_heartbeatno sensitive capabilitynexo_hook_runsno sensitive capabilitynexo_hot_context_listno sensitive capabilitynexo_index_add_dirno sensitive capabilitynexo_index_dirsno sensitive capabilitynexo_index_remove_dirno sensitive capabilitynexo_intraday_memory_cycleno sensitive capabilitynexo_learning_addno sensitive capabilitynexo_learning_apply_retroactivelyno sensitive capabilitynexo_learning_deleteno sensitive capabilitynexo_learning_listno sensitive capabilitynexo_learning_qualityno sensitive capabilitynexo_learning_resolve_candidateno sensitive capabilitynexo_learning_searchno sensitive capabilitynexo_learning_updateno sensitive capabilitynexo_local_asset_getno sensitive capabilitynexo_local_asset_neighborsno sensitive capabilitynexo_local_contextno sensitive capabilitynexo_local_index_controlno sensitive capabilitynexo_local_index_diagnostics_tailno sensitive capabilitynexo_local_index_exclusionsno sensitive capabilitynexo_local_index_filetypesno sensitive capabilitynexo_local_index_migrate_roots_v2no sensitive capabilitynexo_local_index_modelsno sensitive capabilitynexo_local_index_purgeno sensitive capabilitynexo_local_index_rootsno sensitive capabilitynexo_local_index_service_configno sensitive capabilitynexo_local_index_statusno sensitive capabilitynexo_managed_mcp_statusno sensitive capabilitynexo_mcp_write_queue_statusno sensitive capabilitynexo_memory_answerno sensitive capabilitynexo_memory_backfillno sensitive capabilitynexo_memory_event_listno sensitive capabilitynexo_memory_event_statsno sensitive capabilitynexo_memory_forgetno sensitive capabilitynexo_memory_healthno sensitive capabilitynexo_memory_maintenanceno sensitive capabilitynexo_memory_observation_listno sensitive capabilitynexo_memory_observation_processno sensitive capabilitynexo_memory_observation_statsno sensitive capabilitynexo_memory_searchno sensitive capabilitynexo_memory_timelineno sensitive capabilitynexo_menuno sensitive capabilitynexo_opportunity_feedbackno sensitive capabilitynexo_opportunity_getno sensitive capabilitynexo_opportunity_queueno sensitive capabilitynexo_opportunity_refreshno sensitive capabilitynexo_opportunity_suppressno sensitive capabilitynexo_plugin_listno sensitive capabilitynexo_plugin_loadno sensitive capabilitynexo_plugin_removeno sensitive capabilitynexo_pre_action_contextno sensitive capabilitynexo_pre_answer_routeno sensitive capabilitynexo_product_answerno sensitive capabilitynexo_product_capabilitiesno sensitive capabilitynexo_product_knowledge_validateno sensitive capabilitynexo_product_surface_statusno sensitive capabilitynexo_protocol_debt_resolveno sensitive capabilitynexo_recent_contextno sensitive capabilitynexo_recent_context_captureno sensitive capabilitynexo_recent_context_resolveno sensitive capabilitynexo_reindexno sensitive capabilitynexo_reminder_completeno sensitive capabilitynexo_reminder_createno sensitive capabilitynexo_reminder_deleteno sensitive capabilitynexo_reminder_getno sensitive capabilitynexo_reminder_noteno sensitive capabilitynexo_reminder_restoreno sensitive capabilitynexo_reminder_updateno sensitive capabilitynexo_remindersno sensitive capabilitynexo_runtime_service_statusno sensitive capabilitynexo_saved_not_used_auditno sensitive capabilitynexo_sendno sensitive capabilitynexo_session_compliance_stateno sensitive capabilitynexo_session_diary_readno sensitive capabilitynexo_session_diary_writeno sensitive capabilitynexo_session_export_bundleno sensitive capabilitynexo_session_log_closeno sensitive capabilitynexo_session_log_createno sensitive capabilitynexo_session_portable_contextno sensitive capabilitynexo_skill_matchno sensitive capabilitynexo_smart_startupno sensitive capabilitynexo_startupno sensitive capabilitynexo_statusno sensitive capabilitynexo_stopno sensitive capabilitynexo_support_ticket_closeno sensitive capabilitynexo_support_ticket_createno sensitive capabilitynexo_support_ticket_listno sensitive capabilitynexo_support_ticket_messageno sensitive capabilitynexo_support_ticket_readno sensitive capabilitynexo_support_ticket_reopenno sensitive capabilitynexo_system_catalogno sensitive capabilitynexo_task_acknowledge_guardno sensitive capabilitynexo_task_closeno sensitive capabilitynexo_task_frequencyno sensitive capabilitynexo_task_listno sensitive capabilitynexo_task_logno sensitive capabilitynexo_task_openno sensitive capabilitynexo_tool_explainno sensitive capabilitynexo_trackno sensitive capabilitynexo_transcript_readno sensitive capabilitynexo_transcript_recentno sensitive capabilitynexo_transcript_searchno sensitive capabilitynexo_untrackno sensitive capabilitynexo_workflow_compensationno sensitive capabilitynexo_workflow_getno sensitive capabilitynexo_workflow_handoffno sensitive capabilitynexo_workflow_listno sensitive capabilitynexo_workflow_openno sensitive capabilitynexo_workflow_replayno sensitive capabilitynexo_workflow_resumeno sensitive capabilitynexo_workflow_updateno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (170 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v7.38.7 latest |
B 86/100 | 16 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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