Overleaf (netique) MCP Server
@netique/overleaf-mcp
npm
v0.3.6
Published by @netique — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Overleaf with tracked-changes support, via the Socket.IO web API (not the Git bridge).
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 11 = 89. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: read_comment_thread → list_files → open_project. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow read_comment_thread → list_files → open_project
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/auth/browserLogin.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/auth/browserLogin.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import path from "node:path"; import os from "node:os"; import { logger } from "
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/auth/browserLogin.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/auth/chromeFinder.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/auth/chromeFinder.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import path from "node:path"; import os from "node:os"; import { promisify } fro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/auth/chromeFinder.js
medium Tool "edit_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "edit_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "edit_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool edit_file
low Mutating tool "edit_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "edit_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool edit_file
Tools 17
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
edit_filewrites fileslist_filesreads sensitive dataopen_projectnetwork egressread_comment_threadingests untrusted inputread_filereads sensitive dataaccept_changesno sensitive capabilitycompileno sensitive capabilityfind_and_replaceno sensitive capabilitylist_commentsno sensitive capabilitylist_projectsno sensitive capability
Show 7 more tools ↓
list_tracked_changesno sensitive capabilitypingno sensitive capabilityread_logno sensitive capabilityreject_changesno sensitive capabilityreopen_commentno sensitive capabilityreply_commentno sensitive capabilityresolve_commentno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (17 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.6 latest |
B 89/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.3.5 |
B 89/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-24 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @netique/overleaf-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Overleaf 5
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 6 side by side →
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