Overleaf — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@netique/overleaf-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@netique/overleaf-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "@netique/overleaf-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 89,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can create, modify or delete files",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"file-write",
"sensitive-source",
"external-sink",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (17 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: read_comment_thread → list_files → open_project. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "read_comment_thread → list_files → open_project"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"read_comment_thread"
],
"sources": [
"list_files",
"read_file"
],
"sinks": [
"open_project"
],
"path": [
"read_comment_thread",
"list_files",
"open_project"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "read_comment_thread",
"to": "list_files",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "list_files",
"to": "open_project",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
}
],
"wired": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/auth/browserLogin.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/auth/browserLogin.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/auth/browserLogin.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from \"node:child_process\"; import path from \"node:path\"; import os from \"node:os\"; import { logger } from \"",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/auth/browserLogin.js",
"line": 6,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/auth/chromeFinder.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/auth/chromeFinder.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/auth/chromeFinder.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFile } from \"node:child_process\"; import path from \"node:path\"; import os from \"node:os\"; import { promisify } fro",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/auth/chromeFinder.js",
"line": 5,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"edit_file\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"edit_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"edit_file\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "edit_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"edit_file\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"edit_file\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "edit_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"read_comment_thread"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"list_files",
"read_file"
],
"externalSink": [
"open_project"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"read_comment_thread",
"list_files",
"open_project"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: read_comment_thread → list_files → open_project."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "ping",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_comments",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "read_comment_thread",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"read_comment\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "reply_comment",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "resolve_comment",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "reopen_comment",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compile",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "read_log",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "edit_file",
"tags": [
"file-write"
],
"reasons": {
"file-write": [
"keyword \"edit_file\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "find_and_replace",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_files",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"list_files\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_projects",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "open_project",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"open_pr\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "read_file",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_tracked_changes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "accept_changes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "reject_changes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "b57de7ea644dcd31af8bd035b5e87ca1ebfd14e777af658fc9d8169936e605b3",
"stats": {
"tools": 17,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 1,
"high": 2,
"medium": 1,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}