Outline (Vortiago) MCP Server
mcp-outline
PyPI
v1.10.1
Published by vortiago — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Outline (https://www.getoutline.com)
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 1 = 99. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/e2e/conftest.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/e2e/conftest.py:291`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: 031", } subprocess.run( [*_COMPOSE_CMD, "up", "-d", "outline"], cwd=str(PROJECT_
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/e2e/conftest.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/e2e/test_api_key_header.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/e2e/test_api_key_header.py:69`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "] = api_url return subprocess.Popen( [sys.executable, "-m", "mcp_outline"], stdin=subprocess.DEVNUL
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/e2e/test_api_key_header.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/e2e/test_dynamic_tool_list.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/e2e/test_dynamic_tool_list.py:173`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ROCESS_GROUP return subprocess.Popen( [sys.executable, "-m", "mcp_outline"], **kwargs, ) def _
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/e2e/test_dynamic_tool_list.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_health.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_health.py:60`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ] = api_url return subprocess.Popen( [sys.executable, "-m", "mcp_outline"], stdin=subprocess.DEVNUL
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_health.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_stdio_logging.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_stdio_logging.py:35`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "stdio" process = subprocess.Popen( [sys.executable, "-m", "mcp_outline"], stdin=subprocess.PIPE,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_stdio_logging.py
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.10.1 latest |
A 99/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan mcp-outline --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Outline 3
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 4 side by side →
An MCP server for interacting with Outline's API
Model Context Protocol server for outline
MCP stdio server for Outline workspaces
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