Outline (sigee-min) MCP Server

@sigee-min/outline-mcp npm v0.1.2

Published by @sigee-min — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.

MCP stdio server for Outline workspaces

Trust grade
A
95/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 95/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
Moderate
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 95/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 5 = 95. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−3 capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−2 publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 1

medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005

Untrusted-input tools ([download_file_operation]) co-exist with external-action tools ([create_comment]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.

Evidence: untrusted [download_file_operation] → sinks [create_comment]

Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.

Location: flow download_file_operation → create_comment

Tools 60

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • create_commentnetwork egress
  • download_file_operationingests untrusted input
  • acquire_document_leaseno sensitive capability
  • add_collection_groupno sensitive capability
  • add_collection_userno sensitive capability
  • add_document_groupno sensitive capability
  • add_document_userno sensitive capability
  • archive_documentno sensitive capability
  • ask_ai_about_documentsno sensitive capability
  • batch_archive_documentsno sensitive capability
Show 50 more tools ↓
  • batch_create_documentsno sensitive capability
  • batch_delete_documentsno sensitive capability
  • batch_move_documentsno sensitive capability
  • batch_update_documentsno sensitive capability
  • create_collectionno sensitive capability
  • create_documentno sensitive capability
  • create_document_from_templateno sensitive capability
  • create_template_from_documentno sensitive capability
  • delete_collectionno sensitive capability
  • delete_commentno sensitive capability
  • delete_documentno sensitive capability
  • export_all_collectionsno sensitive capability
  • export_collectionno sensitive capability
  • export_documentno sensitive capability
  • get_active_document_leaseno sensitive capability
  • get_collection_structureno sensitive capability
  • get_commentno sensitive capability
  • get_document_backlinksno sensitive capability
  • get_document_id_from_titleno sensitive capability
  • get_file_operationno sensitive capability
  • get_revisionno sensitive capability
  • list_archived_documentsno sensitive capability
  • list_collection_group_membershipsno sensitive capability
  • list_collection_membershipsno sensitive capability
  • list_collectionsno sensitive capability
  • list_commentsno sensitive capability
  • list_document_group_membershipsno sensitive capability
  • list_document_membershipsno sensitive capability
  • list_document_usersno sensitive capability
  • list_eventsno sensitive capability
  • list_file_operationsno sensitive capability
  • list_revisionsno sensitive capability
  • list_templatesno sensitive capability
  • list_trashno sensitive capability
  • move_documentno sensitive capability
  • read_documentno sensitive capability
  • release_document_leaseno sensitive capability
  • remove_collection_groupno sensitive capability
  • remove_collection_userno sensitive capability
  • remove_document_groupno sensitive capability
  • remove_document_userno sensitive capability
  • renew_document_leaseno sensitive capability
  • restore_documentno sensitive capability
  • safe_update_documentno sensitive capability
  • search_documentsno sensitive capability
  • server_infono sensitive capability
  • unarchive_documentno sensitive capability
  • update_collectionno sensitive capability
  • update_commentno sensitive capability
  • update_documentno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v0.1.2 latest A 95/100 1 1.13.0 2026-09-07

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 95/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan @sigee-min/outline-mcp --online

Use the free API → How scoring works

Other implementations of Outline 3

Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 4 side by side →

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