Fleet (matthesketh) MCP Server
@matthesketh/fleet
npm
v1.18.1
Published by @matthesketh — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Docker production management CLI + MCP server for Claude Code
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 16
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/core/backup/system.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/backup/system.js:48`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: '/root/.ssh', '/root/.docker/config.json', '/root/.docker/.token_seed', '/root/.secrets', '/root/.gnupg'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/backup/system.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/adapters/runner/claude-cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/adapters/runner/claude-cli.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { existsSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs'; import { join } from 'node:path
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/adapters/runner/claude-cli.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/adapters/runner/remote.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/adapters/runner/remote.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { shquote, sshConnectFlags } from '../../core/runners/ssh.js'; // build t
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/adapters/runner/remote.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/adapters/runner/shell.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/adapters/runner/shell.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; export function createShellRunner() { return { id: 'shell',
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/adapters/runner/shell.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/commands/guard.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/guard.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { chmodSync, copyFileSync, existsSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync } from 'n
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/commands/guard.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/commands/mcp.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/mcp.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, statSync, writeFileSync, copyFileS
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/commands/mcp.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/commands/mock.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/mock.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { mkdirSync, openSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs'; impo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/commands/mock.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/backup/repo.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/backup/repo.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { FleetError } from '../errors.js'; import { execSafe } from '../exec.js'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/backup/repo.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/exec.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/exec.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; export function execSafe(cmd, args, opts = {}) { const result = spawnSync(cm
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/exec.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/logs-multi.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/logs-multi.js:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { createLineRedactor, effectiveRedaction } from './redaction.js'; const L
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/logs-multi.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/runners/probe.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/runners/probe.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; import { shquote, sshConnectFlags } from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/runners/probe.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/core/deps/collectors/composer.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/deps/collectors/composer.js:36`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res = await fetch(`https://repo.packagist.org/p2/${name}.json`); if (!res.ok) re
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/deps/collectors/composer.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/core/deps/collectors/docker-image.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/deps/collectors/docker-image.js:76`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res = await fetch(`https://hub.docker.com/v2/repositories/${namespace}/${repo}/tags?page_size=50&ordering=la
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/deps/collectors/docker-image.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/core/deps/collectors/eol.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/deps/collectors/eol.js:94`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res = await fetch(`https://endoflife.date/api/${rt.product}/${rt.version}.json`); if (!res.ok)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/deps/collectors/eol.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/core/deps/collectors/pip.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/deps/collectors/pip.js:66`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res = await fetch(`https://pypi.org/pypi/${encodeURIComponent(name)}/json`); if (!res.ok)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/deps/collectors/pip.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/core/telegram.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/telegram.js:18`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res = await fetch(`https://api.telegram.org/bot${config.botToken}/sendMessage`, { method: 'POST'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/telegram.js
Tools 45
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
fleet_audit_guidelinesno sensitive capabilityfleet_audit_ignoreno sensitive capabilityfleet_audit_runno sensitive capabilityfleet_audit_statusno sensitive capabilityfleet_deployno sensitive capabilityfleet_deps_appno sensitive capabilityfleet_deps_configno sensitive capabilityfleet_deps_fixno sensitive capabilityfleet_deps_ignoreno sensitive capabilityfleet_deps_scanno sensitive capability
Show 35 more tools ↓
fleet_deps_statusno sensitive capabilityfleet_egress_snapshotno sensitive capabilityfleet_git_branchno sensitive capabilityfleet_git_commitno sensitive capabilityfleet_git_onboardno sensitive capabilityfleet_git_pr_createno sensitive capabilityfleet_git_pr_listno sensitive capabilityfleet_git_pushno sensitive capabilityfleet_git_releaseno sensitive capabilityfleet_git_statusno sensitive capabilityfleet_logsno sensitive capabilityfleet_logs_recentno sensitive capabilityfleet_logs_searchno sensitive capabilityfleet_logs_statusno sensitive capabilityfleet_logs_summaryno sensitive capabilityfleet_nginx_addno sensitive capabilityfleet_nginx_listno sensitive capabilityfleet_onboardno sensitive capabilityfleet_registerno sensitive capabilityfleet_runner_listno sensitive capabilityfleet_runner_registerno sensitive capabilityfleet_runner_removeno sensitive capabilityfleet_runner_statusno sensitive capabilityfleet_secrets_driftno sensitive capabilityfleet_secrets_getno sensitive capabilityfleet_secrets_listno sensitive capabilityfleet_secrets_restoreno sensitive capabilityfleet_secrets_sealno sensitive capabilityfleet_secrets_setno sensitive capabilityfleet_secrets_statusno sensitive capabilityfleet_secrets_unsealno sensitive capabilityfleet_secrets_validateno sensitive capabilityfleet_service_installno sensitive capabilityfleet_testflight_buildsno sensitive capabilityfleet_testflight_doctorno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (45 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 4
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.18.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 16 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.17.0 |
A 93/100 | 16 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-06 |
v1.16.0 |
A 93/100 | 16 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-10 |
v1.15.1 |
A 93/100 | 16 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-01 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @matthesketh/fleet --onlineOther implementations of Fleet 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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