Fleet (SimplyMinimal) MCP Server
fleet-mcp
PyPI
v1.1.3
Published by simplyminimal — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Model Context Protocol tool for Fleet DM integration
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([fleet_get_query_results, fleet_query_host, fleet_query_host_by_identifier]) and tools that can send data out ([fleet_run_script]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [fleet_get_query_results, fleet_query_host, fleet_query_host_by_identifier] → sinks [fleet_run_script]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow fleet_get_query_results → fleet_run_script
high Tool "fleet_run_script" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "fleet_run_script" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "run_script" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool fleet_run_script
low Mutating tool "fleet_run_script" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "fleet_run_script" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool fleet_run_script
Tools 85
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
fleet_get_query_resultsreads sensitive datafleet_query_hostreads sensitive datafleet_query_host_by_identifierreads sensitive datafleet_run_scriptruns code / shellfleet_add_labels_to_hostno sensitive capabilityfleet_batch_set_softwareno sensitive capabilityfleet_cancel_batch_scriptno sensitive capabilityfleet_cancel_host_activityno sensitive capabilityfleet_cancel_queryno sensitive capabilityfleet_create_custom_variableno sensitive capability
Show 75 more tools ↓
fleet_create_queryno sensitive capabilityfleet_create_scriptno sensitive capabilityfleet_create_setup_assistantno sensitive capabilityfleet_delete_bootstrap_packageno sensitive capabilityfleet_delete_custom_variableno sensitive capabilityfleet_delete_hostno sensitive capabilityfleet_delete_mdm_profileno sensitive capabilityfleet_delete_queryno sensitive capabilityfleet_delete_scriptno sensitive capabilityfleet_delete_setup_assistantno sensitive capabilityfleet_find_software_on_hostno sensitive capabilityfleet_get_batch_scriptno sensitive capabilityfleet_get_bootstrap_metadatano sensitive capabilityfleet_get_bootstrap_summaryno sensitive capabilityfleet_get_cveno sensitive capabilityfleet_get_filevault_summaryno sensitive capabilityfleet_get_hostno sensitive capabilityfleet_get_host_by_identifierno sensitive capabilityfleet_get_host_device_mappingno sensitive capabilityfleet_get_host_encryption_keyno sensitive capabilityfleet_get_host_macadminsno sensitive capabilityfleet_get_host_mdmno sensitive capabilityfleet_get_host_mdm_profilesno sensitive capabilityfleet_get_host_softwareno sensitive capabilityfleet_get_mdm_command_resultsno sensitive capabilityfleet_get_mdm_profiles_summaryno sensitive capabilityfleet_get_osquery_table_schemano sensitive capabilityfleet_get_queryno sensitive capabilityfleet_get_query_reportno sensitive capabilityfleet_get_scriptno sensitive capabilityfleet_get_script_resultno sensitive capabilityfleet_get_setup_assistantno sensitive capabilityfleet_get_softwareno sensitive capabilityfleet_get_software_install_resultno sensitive capabilityfleet_get_software_titleno sensitive capabilityfleet_get_userno sensitive capabilityfleet_get_vulnerabilitiesno sensitive capabilityfleet_install_softwareno sensitive capabilityfleet_list_activitiesno sensitive capabilityfleet_list_async_queriesno sensitive capabilityfleet_list_batch_script_hostsno sensitive capabilityfleet_list_batch_scriptsno sensitive capabilityfleet_list_custom_variablesno sensitive capabilityfleet_list_host_certificatesno sensitive capabilityfleet_list_host_past_activitiesno sensitive capabilityfleet_list_host_scriptsno sensitive capabilityfleet_list_host_upcoming_activitiesno sensitive capabilityfleet_list_hostsno sensitive capabilityfleet_list_mdm_apple_installersno sensitive capabilityfleet_list_mdm_commandsno sensitive capabilityfleet_list_mdm_devicesno sensitive capabilityfleet_list_mdm_profilesno sensitive capabilityfleet_list_osquery_tablesno sensitive capabilityfleet_list_queriesno sensitive capabilityfleet_list_scriptsno sensitive capabilityfleet_list_softwareno sensitive capabilityfleet_list_software_titlesno sensitive capabilityfleet_list_usersno sensitive capabilityfleet_lock_deviceno sensitive capabilityfleet_lock_hostno sensitive capabilityfleet_modify_scriptno sensitive capabilityfleet_refetch_hostno sensitive capabilityfleet_remove_labels_from_hostno sensitive capabilityfleet_run_batch_scriptno sensitive capabilityfleet_run_live_query_with_resultsno sensitive capabilityfleet_run_saved_queryno sensitive capabilityfleet_search_hostsno sensitive capabilityfleet_search_softwareno sensitive capabilityfleet_suggest_tables_for_queryno sensitive capabilityfleet_transfer_hostsno sensitive capabilityfleet_unenroll_host_mdmno sensitive capabilityfleet_unlock_hostno sensitive capabilityfleet_upload_bootstrap_packageno sensitive capabilityfleet_upload_mdm_apple_installerno sensitive capabilityfleet_upload_mdm_profileno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (85 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.1.3 latest |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan fleet-mcp --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Fleet 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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