Fleet — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@matthesketh/fleet",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@matthesketh/fleet"
},
"server": {
"name": "@matthesketh/fleet"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (45 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/core/backup/system.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/core/backup/system.js:48`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/core/backup/system.js"
},
"evidence": "'/root/.ssh', '/root/.docker/config.json', '/root/.docker/.token_seed', '/root/.secrets', '/root/.gnupg'",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "dist/core/backup/system.js",
"line": 48,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/adapters/runner/claude-cli.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/adapters/runner/claude-cli.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/adapters/runner/claude-cli.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { existsSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs'; import { join } from 'node:path",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/adapters/runner/claude-cli.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/adapters/runner/remote.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/adapters/runner/remote.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/adapters/runner/remote.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { shquote, sshConnectFlags } from '../../core/runners/ssh.js'; // build t",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/adapters/runner/remote.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/adapters/runner/shell.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/adapters/runner/shell.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/adapters/runner/shell.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; export function createShellRunner() { return { id: 'shell',",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/adapters/runner/shell.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/commands/guard.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/guard.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/commands/guard.js"
},
"evidence": "spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { chmodSync, copyFileSync, existsSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync } from 'n",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/commands/guard.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/commands/mcp.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/mcp.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/commands/mcp.js"
},
"evidence": "spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, statSync, writeFileSync, copyFileS",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/commands/mcp.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/commands/mock.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/mock.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/commands/mock.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { mkdirSync, openSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs'; impo",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/commands/mock.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/backup/repo.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/core/backup/repo.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/core/backup/repo.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { FleetError } from '../errors.js'; import { execSafe } from '../exec.js'",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/core/backup/repo.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/exec.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/core/exec.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/core/exec.js"
},
"evidence": "spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; export function execSafe(cmd, args, opts = {}) { const result = spawnSync(cm",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/core/exec.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/logs-multi.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/core/logs-multi.js:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/core/logs-multi.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { createLineRedactor, effectiveRedaction } from './redaction.js'; const L",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/core/logs-multi.js",
"line": 16,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/runners/probe.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/core/runners/probe.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/core/runners/probe.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; import { shquote, sshConnectFlags } from",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/core/runners/probe.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/core/deps/collectors/composer.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/core/deps/collectors/composer.js:36`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/core/deps/collectors/composer.js"
},
"evidence": "const res = await fetch(`https://repo.packagist.org/p2/${name}.json`); if (!res.ok) re",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/core/deps/collectors/composer.js",
"line": 36,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/core/deps/collectors/docker-image.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/core/deps/collectors/docker-image.js:76`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/core/deps/collectors/docker-image.js"
},
"evidence": "const res = await fetch(`https://hub.docker.com/v2/repositories/${namespace}/${repo}/tags?page_size=50&ordering=la",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/core/deps/collectors/docker-image.js",
"line": 76,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/core/deps/collectors/eol.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/core/deps/collectors/eol.js:94`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/core/deps/collectors/eol.js"
},
"evidence": "const res = await fetch(`https://endoflife.date/api/${rt.product}/${rt.version}.json`); if (!res.ok)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/core/deps/collectors/eol.js",
"line": 94,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/core/deps/collectors/pip.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/core/deps/collectors/pip.js:66`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/core/deps/collectors/pip.js"
},
"evidence": "const res = await fetch(`https://pypi.org/pypi/${encodeURIComponent(name)}/json`); if (!res.ok)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/core/deps/collectors/pip.js",
"line": 66,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/core/telegram.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/core/telegram.js:18`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/core/telegram.js"
},
"evidence": "const res = await fetch(`https://api.telegram.org/bot${config.botToken}/sendMessage`, { method: 'POST'",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/core/telegram.js",
"line": 18,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "fleet_audit_run",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_audit_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_audit_ignore",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_audit_guidelines",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_deps_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_deps_scan",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_deps_app",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_deps_fix",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_deps_ignore",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_deps_config",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_git_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_git_onboard",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_git_branch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_git_commit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_git_push",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_git_pr_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_git_pr_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_git_release",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_runner_register",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_runner_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_runner_remove",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_runner_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_secrets_set",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_secrets_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_secrets_seal",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_secrets_drift",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_secrets_restore",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_logs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_logs_recent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_logs_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_logs_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_egress_snapshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_logs_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_deploy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_nginx_add",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_nginx_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_secrets_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_secrets_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_secrets_unseal",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_secrets_validate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_register",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_onboard",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_service_install",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_testflight_builds",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_testflight_doctor",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "fb830ee29a2bcc8917807d877ca0050a6a5f52d2904b66d0af75f07d6eafcb1c",
"stats": {
"tools": 45,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 11,
"medium": 5,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}