Obsidian Modified — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@marwansaab/obsidian-modified-mcp-server",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@marwansaab/obsidian-modified-mcp-server"
},
"server": {
"name": "@marwansaab/obsidian-modified-mcp-server"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can create, modify or delete files",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"file-write",
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (32 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-004",
"title": "Sensitive-source and external-sink co-exist",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tools that read sensitive data ([list_files_in_vault, list_files_in_dir, get_file_contents, batch_get_file_contents, get_heading_contents, get_frontmatter_field, patch_content]) and tools that can send data out ([execute_command]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.",
"remediation": "Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "list_files_in_vault → execute_command"
},
"evidence": "sources [list_files_in_vault, list_files_in_dir, get_file_contents, batch_get_file_contents, get_heading_contents, get_frontmatter_field, patch_content] → sinks",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"sources": [
"list_files_in_vault",
"list_files_in_dir",
"get_file_contents",
"batch_get_file_contents",
"get_heading_contents",
"get_frontmatter_field",
"patch_content"
],
"sinks": [
"execute_command"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"execute_command\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"execute_command\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"execute command\" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "execute_command"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"delete_file\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"delete_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"delete_file\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "delete_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"delete_file\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"delete_file\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "delete_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"execute_command\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"execute_command\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "execute_command"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"filepath\" on \"get_file_contents\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"get_file_contents\" takes a path parameter \"filepath\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "get_file_contents",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.filepath"
},
"data": {
"param": "filepath"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [],
"sensitiveSource": [
"list_files_in_vault",
"list_files_in_dir",
"get_file_contents",
"batch_get_file_contents",
"get_heading_contents",
"get_frontmatter_field",
"patch_content"
],
"externalSink": [
"execute_command"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"batch_get_file_contents",
"execute_command"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A sensitive-source → external-sink chain exists: batch_get_file_contents → execute_command."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "delete_file",
"tags": [
"file-write"
],
"reasons": {
"file-write": [
"keyword \"delete_file\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_files_in_vault",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"list_files\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_files_in_dir",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"list_files\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_file_contents",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"get_file_contents\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "batch_get_file_contents",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"get_file_contents\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "find_and_replace",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_vault_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_vault_structure",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_orphan_notes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_note_connections",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_path_between_notes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_most_connected_notes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "detect_note_clusters",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_tags",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_active_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "open_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_commands",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "execute_command",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"execute command\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_periodic_note",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_recent_periodic_notes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_recent_changes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "complex_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pattern_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "semantic_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_similar_notes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_heading_contents",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"get_file_contents\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_frontmatter_field",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"get_file_contents\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_vaults",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "patch_content",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"get_file_contents\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "append_content",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "put_content",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "0c9c343e24f94a3b44dd64a65a8eeb28d4b30c42b8c40d2775e27b938a2dad6c",
"stats": {
"tools": 32,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 2,
"medium": 1,
"low": 3,
"info": 0
}
}
}