Obsidian Modified MCP Server
@marwansaab/obsidian-modified-mcp-server
npm
v0.6.0
Published by @marwansaab — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Personal fork of @connorbritain/obsidian-mcp-server. TypeScript MCP server for Obsidian with wrapper-side mitigations of upstream limitations — first concrete change is re-enabling patch_content under a structural-only path validator.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([list_files_in_vault, list_files_in_dir, get_file_contents, batch_get_file_contents, get_heading_contents, get_frontmatter_field, patch_content]) and tools that can send data out ([execute_command]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [list_files_in_vault, list_files_in_dir, get_file_contents, batch_get_file_contents, get_heading_contents, get_frontmatter_field, patch_content] → sinks
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow list_files_in_vault → execute_command
high Tool "execute_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "execute_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "execute command" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool execute_command
medium Tool "delete_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool delete_file
low Mutating tool "delete_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "delete_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool delete_file
low Mutating tool "execute_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "execute_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool execute_command
low Unconstrained path parameter "filepath" on "get_file_contents"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "get_file_contents" takes a path parameter "filepath" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool get_file_contents · inputSchema.properties.filepath
Tools 32
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
batch_get_file_contentsreads sensitive datadelete_filewrites filesexecute_commandruns code / shellget_file_contentsreads sensitive dataget_frontmatter_fieldreads sensitive dataget_heading_contentsreads sensitive datalist_files_in_dirreads sensitive datalist_files_in_vaultreads sensitive datapatch_contentreads sensitive dataappend_contentno sensitive capability
Show 22 more tools ↓
complex_searchno sensitive capabilitydetect_note_clustersno sensitive capabilityfind_and_replaceno sensitive capabilityfind_orphan_notesno sensitive capabilityfind_path_between_notesno sensitive capabilityfind_similar_notesno sensitive capabilityget_active_fileno sensitive capabilityget_most_connected_notesno sensitive capabilityget_note_connectionsno sensitive capabilityget_periodic_noteno sensitive capabilityget_recent_changesno sensitive capabilityget_recent_periodic_notesno sensitive capabilityget_vault_statsno sensitive capabilityget_vault_structureno sensitive capabilitylist_commandsno sensitive capabilitylist_tagsno sensitive capabilitylist_vaultsno sensitive capabilityopen_fileno sensitive capabilitypattern_searchno sensitive capabilityput_contentno sensitive capabilitysearchno sensitive capabilitysemantic_searchno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (32 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.6.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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