Raw scan report

Luzzy Tool — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.

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{
  "tool": {
    "name": "mcptrustchecker",
    "version": "1.13.0",
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
  },
  "target": {
    "id": "luzzy-tool",
    "source": {
      "kind": "package",
      "origin": "luzzy-tool"
    },
    "server": {
      "name": "luzzy-tool"
    }
  },
  "grade": "A",
  "score": {
    "score": 93,
    "threatScore": 100,
    "grade": "A",
    "band": "A",
    "categorySubtotals": {
      "injection": 0,
      "exfiltration": 0,
      "permissions": 0,
      "supply-chain": 0,
      "network": 0,
      "hygiene": 0
    },
    "vector": [
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "capability-exposure",
        "level": "high",
        "label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
        "appliedPenalty": 6
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "verification-discount",
        "level": "repo",
        "label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
        "appliedPenalty": 1
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "coverage-honesty",
        "level": "source",
        "label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
        "appliedPenalty": 0
      }
    ],
    "gatesFired": [],
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
  },
  "capability": {
    "level": "high",
    "reasons": [
      "can send data / act on an external service",
      "can create, modify or delete files",
      "reads sensitive or local data",
      "has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
      "can execute shell commands or code"
    ],
    "tags": [
      "file-write",
      "code-exec",
      "sensitive-source",
      "external-sink"
    ]
  },
  "coverage": {
    "level": "source",
    "inputs": {
      "toolSurface": true,
      "implementationSource": true,
      "packageMetadata": true,
      "liveTransport": false
    },
    "caveats": [
      "Tools were statically extracted from the published source (70 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
    ]
  },
  "findings": [
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-004",
      "title": "Sensitive-source and external-sink co-exist",
      "category": "exfiltration",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "Tools that read sensitive data ([get_env, db_execute_query, db_execute_update]) and tools that can send data out ([execute_command, execute_batch, execute_command_structured, spawn_process, http_request]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.",
      "remediation": "Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "flow",
        "name": "get_env → execute_command"
      },
      "evidence": "sources [get_env, db_execute_query, db_execute_update] → sinks [execute_command, execute_batch, execute_command_structured, spawn_process, http_request]",
      "owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
      "references": [],
      "data": {
        "sources": [
          "get_env",
          "db_execute_query",
          "db_execute_update"
        ],
        "sinks": [
          "execute_command",
          "execute_batch",
          "execute_command_structured",
          "spawn_process",
          "http_request"
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
      "title": "Tool \"execute_command\" exposes command/code execution",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "Tool \"execute_command\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"execute command\" in tool name, parameter \"command\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
      "remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "execute_command"
      },
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "tags": [
          "code-exec"
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
      "title": "Tool \"execute_batch\" exposes command/code execution",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "Tool \"execute_batch\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter \"shell\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
      "remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "execute_batch"
      },
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "tags": [
          "code-exec"
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
      "title": "Tool \"execute_command_structured\" exposes command/code execution",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "Tool \"execute_command_structured\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"execute command\" in tool name, parameter \"command\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
      "remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "execute_command_structured"
      },
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "tags": [
          "code-exec"
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
      "title": "Tool \"spawn_process\" exposes command/code execution",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "Tool \"spawn_process\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"spawn\" in tool name, parameter \"command\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
      "remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "spawn_process"
      },
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "tags": [
          "code-exec"
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/modules/code_searcher.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`src/modules/code_searcher.py:34`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "src/modules/code_searcher.py"
      },
      "evidence": "result = subprocess.run( ['rg', '--version'], capture_output=True, text=True, timeou",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "src/modules/code_searcher.py",
        "line": 34,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/modules/enhanced_shell_executor.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`src/modules/enhanced_shell_executor.py:25`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "src/modules/enhanced_shell_executor.py"
      },
      "evidence": "t_id = 1 def spawn( self, command: str, cwd: Optional[str] = None, env: O",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "src/modules/enhanced_shell_executor.py",
        "line": 25,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/modules/git_manager.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`src/modules/git_manager.py:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "src/modules/git_manager.py"
      },
      "evidence": "try: r = subprocess.run( [\"git\", \"rev-parse\", \"--is-inside-work-tree\"],",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "src/modules/git_manager.py",
        "line": 17,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/modules/network_diagnostics.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`src/modules/network_diagnostics.py:76`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "src/modules/network_diagnostics.py"
      },
      "evidence": ": result = subprocess.run( cmd, capture_output=True, timeout=timeout * count + 10,",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "src/modules/network_diagnostics.py",
        "line": 76,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/modules/shell_executor.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`src/modules/shell_executor.py:70`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "src/modules/shell_executor.py"
      },
      "evidence": "allow_shell: 是否允许使用 shell=True(默认False,使用安全模式) Returns: 执行结果 \"\"\" try:",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "src/modules/shell_executor.py",
        "line": 70,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-007",
      "title": "Unconstrained URL/host parameter \"url\" on \"http_request\"",
      "category": "network",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "Tool \"http_request\" takes a URL/host parameter \"url\" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).",
      "remediation": "Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "http_request",
        "field": "inputSchema.properties.url"
      },
      "owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
      "data": {
        "param": "url"
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
      "title": "Tool \"move_file\" can modify the filesystem",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "Tool \"move_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"move_file\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
      "remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "move_file"
      },
      "data": {
        "tags": [
          "file-write"
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
      "title": "Tool \"delete_file\" can modify the filesystem",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "Tool \"delete_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"delete_file\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
      "remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "delete_file"
      },
      "data": {
        "tags": [
          "file-write"
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
      "title": "Tool \"delete_files\" can modify the filesystem",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "Tool \"delete_files\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"delete_file\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
      "remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "delete_files"
      },
      "data": {
        "tags": [
          "file-write"
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
      "title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"command\" on \"execute_command\"",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "Tool \"execute_command\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"command\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
      "remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "execute_command",
        "field": "inputSchema.properties.command"
      },
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "param": "command"
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
      "title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"shell\" on \"execute_command\"",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "Tool \"execute_command\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"shell\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
      "remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "execute_command",
        "field": "inputSchema.properties.shell"
      },
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "param": "shell"
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
      "title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"shell\" on \"execute_batch\"",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "Tool \"execute_batch\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"shell\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
      "remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "execute_batch",
        "field": "inputSchema.properties.shell"
      },
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "param": "shell"
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
      "title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"command\" on \"execute_command_structured\"",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "Tool \"execute_command_structured\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"command\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
      "remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "execute_command_structured",
        "field": "inputSchema.properties.command"
      },
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "param": "command"
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
      "title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"shell\" on \"execute_command_structured\"",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "Tool \"execute_command_structured\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"shell\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
      "remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "execute_command_structured",
        "field": "inputSchema.properties.shell"
      },
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "param": "shell"
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
      "title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"command\" on \"spawn_process\"",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "Tool \"spawn_process\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"command\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
      "remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "spawn_process",
        "field": "inputSchema.properties.command"
      },
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "param": "command"
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
      "title": "Mutating tool \"move_file\" declares no destructiveHint",
      "category": "hygiene",
      "severity": "low",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "Tool \"move_file\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
      "remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "move_file"
      },
      "data": {
        "tags": [
          "file-write"
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
      "title": "Mutating tool \"delete_file\" declares no destructiveHint",
      "category": "hygiene",
      "severity": "low",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "Tool \"delete_file\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
      "remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "delete_file"
      },
      "data": {
        "tags": [
          "file-write"
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
      "title": "Mutating tool \"execute_command\" declares no destructiveHint",
      "category": "hygiene",
      "severity": "low",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "Tool \"execute_command\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
      "remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "execute_command"
      },
      "data": {
        "tags": [
          "code-exec"
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
      "title": "Mutating tool \"execute_batch\" declares no destructiveHint",
      "category": "hygiene",
      "severity": "low",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "Tool \"execute_batch\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
      "remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "execute_batch"
      },
      "data": {
        "tags": [
          "code-exec"
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
      "title": "Mutating tool \"delete_files\" declares no destructiveHint",
      "category": "hygiene",
      "severity": "low",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "Tool \"delete_files\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
      "remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "delete_files"
      },
      "data": {
        "tags": [
          "file-write"
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
      "title": "Mutating tool \"execute_command_structured\" declares no destructiveHint",
      "category": "hygiene",
      "severity": "low",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "Tool \"execute_command_structured\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
      "remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "execute_command_structured"
      },
      "data": {
        "tags": [
          "code-exec"
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
      "title": "Mutating tool \"spawn_process\" declares no destructiveHint",
      "category": "hygiene",
      "severity": "low",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "Tool \"spawn_process\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
      "remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "spawn_process"
      },
      "data": {
        "tags": [
          "code-exec"
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
      "title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"source_path\" on \"move_file\"",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "low",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "Tool \"move_file\" takes a path parameter \"source_path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
      "remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "move_file",
        "field": "inputSchema.properties.source_path"
      },
      "data": {
        "param": "source_path"
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
      "title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"destination_path\" on \"move_file\"",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "low",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
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}