Luzzy Tool MCP Server
luzzy-tool
PyPI
v2.5.2
Published by luzzymeow — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
基于MCP协议的本地系统工具集，为AI助手提供文件操作、Shell执行、代码搜索、文件监听、压缩解压、HTTP请求、Git操作、数据库操作、网络诊断、Markdown渲染和结构化数据处理
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 33
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([get_env, db_execute_query, db_execute_update]) and tools that can send data out ([execute_command, execute_batch, execute_command_structured, spawn_process, http_request]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [get_env, db_execute_query, db_execute_update] → sinks [execute_command, execute_batch, execute_command_structured, spawn_process, http_request]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow get_env → execute_command
high Tool "execute_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "execute_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "execute command" in tool name, parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool execute_command
high Tool "execute_batch" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "execute_batch" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "shell"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool execute_batch
high Tool "execute_command_structured" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "execute_command_structured" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "execute command" in tool name, parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool execute_command_structured
high Tool "spawn_process" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "spawn_process" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "spawn" in tool name, parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool spawn_process
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/modules/code_searcher.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/modules/code_searcher.py:34`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: result = subprocess.run( ['rg', '--version'], capture_output=True, text=True, timeou
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/modules/code_searcher.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/modules/enhanced_shell_executor.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/modules/enhanced_shell_executor.py:25`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: t_id = 1 def spawn( self, command: str, cwd: Optional[str] = None, env: O
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/modules/enhanced_shell_executor.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/modules/git_manager.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/modules/git_manager.py:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: r = subprocess.run( ["git", "rev-parse", "--is-inside-work-tree"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/modules/git_manager.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/modules/network_diagnostics.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/modules/network_diagnostics.py:76`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: : result = subprocess.run( cmd, capture_output=True, timeout=timeout * count + 10,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/modules/network_diagnostics.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/modules/shell_executor.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/modules/shell_executor.py:70`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: allow_shell: 是否允许使用 shell=True（默认False，使用安全模式） Returns: 执行结果 """ try:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/modules/shell_executor.py
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "http_request"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "http_request" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool http_request · inputSchema.properties.url
medium Tool "move_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "move_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "move_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool move_file
medium Tool "delete_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool delete_file
medium Tool "delete_files" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "delete_files" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool delete_files
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "execute_command"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "execute_command" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool execute_command · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "shell" on "execute_command"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "execute_command" takes a command-shaped parameter "shell" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool execute_command · inputSchema.properties.shell
medium Unconstrained command parameter "shell" on "execute_batch"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "execute_batch" takes a command-shaped parameter "shell" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool execute_batch · inputSchema.properties.shell
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "execute_command_structured"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "execute_command_structured" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool execute_command_structured · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "shell" on "execute_command_structured"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "execute_command_structured" takes a command-shaped parameter "shell" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool execute_command_structured · inputSchema.properties.shell
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "spawn_process"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "spawn_process" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool spawn_process · inputSchema.properties.command
low Mutating tool "move_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "move_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool move_file
low Mutating tool "delete_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "delete_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool delete_file
low Mutating tool "execute_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "execute_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool execute_command
low Mutating tool "execute_batch" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "execute_batch" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool execute_batch
low Mutating tool "delete_files" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "delete_files" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool delete_files
low Mutating tool "execute_command_structured" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "execute_command_structured" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool execute_command_structured
low Mutating tool "spawn_process" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "spawn_process" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool spawn_process
low Unconstrained path parameter "source_path" on "move_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "move_file" takes a path parameter "source_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool move_file · inputSchema.properties.source_path
low Unconstrained path parameter "destination_path" on "move_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "move_file" takes a path parameter "destination_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool move_file · inputSchema.properties.destination_path
low Unconstrained path parameter "file_path" on "delete_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "delete_file" takes a path parameter "file_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool delete_file · inputSchema.properties.file_path
low Unconstrained path parameter "file_paths" on "delete_files"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "delete_files" takes a path parameter "file_paths" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool delete_files · inputSchema.properties.file_paths
low Unconstrained path parameter "db_path" on "db_execute_query"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "db_execute_query" takes a path parameter "db_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool db_execute_query · inputSchema.properties.db_path
low Unconstrained path parameter "db_path" on "db_execute_update"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "db_execute_update" takes a path parameter "db_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool db_execute_update · inputSchema.properties.db_path
Tools 70
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
db_execute_queryreads sensitive datadb_execute_updatereads sensitive datadelete_filewrites filesdelete_fileswrites filesexecute_batchruns code / shellexecute_commandruns code / shellexecute_command_structuredruns code / shellget_envreads sensitive datahttp_requestnetwork egressmove_filewrites files
Show 60 more tools ↓
spawn_processruns code / shellarchive_createno sensitive capabilityarchive_extractno sensitive capabilityarchive_listno sensitive capabilityarchive_testno sensitive capabilitybackup_fileno sensitive capabilityclear_command_historyno sensitive capabilityclear_retrieval_cacheno sensitive capabilitycode_searchno sensitive capabilitycopy_fileno sensitive capabilitycopy_filesno sensitive capabilitycreate_directoryno sensitive capabilitydb_describe_tableno sensitive capabilitydb_get_table_datano sensitive capabilitydb_list_tablesno sensitive capabilityedit_by_headingno sensitive capabilityedit_jsonno sensitive capabilityedit_paragraphno sensitive capabilityedit_yamlno sensitive capabilityfile_writeno sensitive capabilityget_command_historyno sensitive capabilityget_file_infono sensitive capabilityget_paragraphsno sensitive capabilityget_system_infono sensitive capabilitygit_addno sensitive capabilitygit_branchno sensitive capabilitygit_commitno sensitive capabilitygit_diffno sensitive capabilitygit_logno sensitive capabilitygit_pullno sensitive capabilitygit_pushno sensitive capabilitygit_remoteno sensitive capabilitygit_stashno sensitive capabilitygit_statusno sensitive capabilitykill_processno sensitive capabilitylist_backupsno sensitive capabilitylist_local_directoryno sensitive capabilitylist_processesno sensitive capabilitylist_toolsno sensitive capabilitymd_check_linksno sensitive capabilitymd_extract_linksno sensitive capabilitymd_generate_tocno sensitive capabilitymd_render_to_htmlno sensitive capabilitynet_check_connectivityno sensitive capabilitynet_dns_lookupno sensitive capabilitynet_pingno sensitive capabilitynet_port_scanno sensitive capabilitynet_reverse_dnsno sensitive capabilityread_local_fileno sensitive capabilityrename_fileno sensitive capabilityrestore_fileno sensitive capabilityretrieve_from_local_filesno sensitive capabilitysearch_filesno sensitive capabilityset_envno sensitive capabilityvalidate_jsonno sensitive capabilityvalidate_yamlno sensitive capabilitywatch_eventsno sensitive capabilitywatch_listno sensitive capabilitywatch_startno sensitive capabilitywatch_stopno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (70 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.5.2 latest |
A 93/100 | 33 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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