Inkstone — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "inkstone-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "inkstone-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "inkstone-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 91,
"threatScore": 99,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 1.2,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "none",
"label": "publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read",
"appliedPenalty": 2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (29 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/llm/client.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/llm/client.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/llm/client.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { OLLAMA_URL, OLLAMA_CHAT_MODEL, OPENROUTER_API_KEY, OPENROUTER_URL, OPEN",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/llm/client.js",
"line": 7,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/nightly/pipeline.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/nightly/pipeline.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/nightly/pipeline.js"
},
"evidence": ", execSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { existsSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync } from \"node:fs\"; im",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/nightly/pipeline.js",
"line": 8,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/nlm/client.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/nlm/client.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/nlm/client.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFile } from \"node:child_process\"; import { promisify } from \"node:util\"; const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile)",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/nlm/client.js",
"line": 7,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/llm/client.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/llm/client.ts:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/llm/client.ts"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { OLLAMA_URL, OLLAMA_CHAT_MODEL, OPENROUTER_API_KEY, OPENROUTER_URL,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/llm/client.ts",
"line": 8,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/nightly/pipeline.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/nightly/pipeline.ts:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/nightly/pipeline.ts"
},
"evidence": ", execSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { existsSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync } from \"node:fs\"; im",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/nightly/pipeline.ts",
"line": 9,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/nlm/client.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/nlm/client.ts:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/nlm/client.ts"
},
"evidence": "{ execFile } from \"node:child_process\"; import { promisify } from \"node:util\"; import type { NlmNotebook, NlmQueryResult",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/nlm/client.ts",
"line": 8,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/setup.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/setup.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/setup.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { OLLAMA_URL, OLLAMA_CHAT_MODEL, OLLAMA_EMBED_MODEL } from \"./config.js\";",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/setup.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (src/setup.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`src/setup.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/setup.ts"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { OLLAMA_URL, OLLAMA_CHAT_MODEL, OLLAMA_EMBED_MODEL } from \"./config.js\";",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/setup.ts",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
"title": "Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "\"inkstone-mcp\" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.",
"remediation": "Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "inkstone-mcp"
},
"evidence": "node -e \"console.log('\\n Inkstone installed! Run \\x1b[1minkstone setup\\x1b[0m to check prerequisites (Ollama, Gemma 4, embeddings).\\n')\"",
"owasp": "LLM03:2025 Supply Chain",
"references": [
"https://github.com/ossf/package-analysis",
"https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/"
],
"data": {
"scripts": [
"postinstall"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package declares no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"inkstone-mcp\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "inkstone-mcp"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "memory_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_deep_query",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_hybrid_answer",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_nlm_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_write",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_dream",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_goals",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_failures",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_contradictions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_hypotheses",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_self_model",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_consolidate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_global_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_summarize",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_nlm_sync",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_nlm_query",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "user_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "user_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "user_remove",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "namespace_grant",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "namespace_revoke",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_graph_neighbors",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_graph_path",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_graph_contradictions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_graph_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_graph_centrality",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_gemini_sync",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_gemini_query",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "f89bd879a6bccec1e62da53b668b06be6d45d9e962fdc84770ee66d0e82e0810",
"stats": {
"tools": 29,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 6,
"medium": 0,
"low": 3,
"info": 1
}
}
}