Inkstone MCP Server
inkstone-mcp
npm
v0.1.6
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Agentic memory server with a dream cycle for decay, consolidation, and archival of memories.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 8 = 91. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 9
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/llm/client.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/llm/client.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; import { OLLAMA_URL, OLLAMA_CHAT_MODEL, OPENROUTER_API_KEY, OPENROUTER_URL, OPEN
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/llm/client.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/nightly/pipeline.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/nightly/pipeline.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: , execSync } from "node:child_process"; import { existsSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync } from "node:fs"; im
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/nightly/pipeline.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/nlm/client.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/nlm/client.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/nlm/client.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/llm/client.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/llm/client.ts:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; import { OLLAMA_URL, OLLAMA_CHAT_MODEL, OPENROUTER_API_KEY, OPENROUTER_URL,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/llm/client.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/nightly/pipeline.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/nightly/pipeline.ts:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: , execSync } from "node:child_process"; import { existsSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync } from "node:fs"; im
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/nightly/pipeline.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/nlm/client.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/nlm/client.ts:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; import type { NlmNotebook, NlmQueryResult
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/nlm/client.ts
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/setup.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/setup.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; import { OLLAMA_URL, OLLAMA_CHAT_MODEL, OLLAMA_EMBED_MODEL } from "./config.js";
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/setup.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (src/setup.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`src/setup.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; import { OLLAMA_URL, OLLAMA_CHAT_MODEL, OLLAMA_EMBED_MODEL } from "./config.js";
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/setup.ts
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"inkstone-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node -e "console.log('\n Inkstone installed! Run \x1b[1minkstone setup\x1b[0m to check prerequisites (Ollama, Gemma 4, embeddings).\n')"
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package inkstone-mcp
Tools 29
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
memory_consolidateno sensitive capabilitymemory_contradictionsno sensitive capabilitymemory_deep_queryno sensitive capabilitymemory_dreamno sensitive capabilitymemory_failuresno sensitive capabilitymemory_gemini_queryno sensitive capabilitymemory_gemini_syncno sensitive capabilitymemory_getno sensitive capabilitymemory_global_searchno sensitive capabilitymemory_goalsno sensitive capability
Show 19 more tools ↓
memory_graph_centralityno sensitive capabilitymemory_graph_contextno sensitive capabilitymemory_graph_contradictionsno sensitive capabilitymemory_graph_neighborsno sensitive capabilitymemory_graph_pathno sensitive capabilitymemory_hybrid_answerno sensitive capabilitymemory_hypothesesno sensitive capabilitymemory_nlm_queryno sensitive capabilitymemory_nlm_statusno sensitive capabilitymemory_nlm_syncno sensitive capabilitymemory_searchno sensitive capabilitymemory_self_modelno sensitive capabilitymemory_summarizeno sensitive capabilitymemory_writeno sensitive capabilitynamespace_grantno sensitive capabilitynamespace_revokeno sensitive capabilityuser_createno sensitive capabilityuser_listno sensitive capabilityuser_removeno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (29 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.6 latest |
A 91/100 | 9 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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