Devtools (gjsify) MCP Server
@gjsify/devtools-mcp
npm
v0.48.0
Published by @gjsify — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP↔devtools bridge for GJS apps — exposes a running app's org.gjsify.Devtools control plane (DBus) to an AI agent as MCP tools
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 11 = 89. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: get_page_info → activate_widget → eval_js. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow get_page_info → activate_widget → eval_js
high Tool "eval_js" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "eval_js" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool eval_js
low Mutating tool "eval_js" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "eval_js" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool eval_js
Tools 41
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
activate_widgetreads sensitive datadump_cssreads sensitive datadump_gsettingsreads sensitive datadump_treereads sensitive dataeval_jsruns code / shellget_page_infoingests untrusted inputactivate_actionno sensitive capabilitycdp_connectno sensitive capabilitycdp_discover_targetsno sensitive capabilitycdp_drain_eventsno sensitive capability
Show 31 more tools ↓
cdp_sendno sensitive capabilitychange_action_stateno sensitive capabilitydevice_screenshotno sensitive capabilitydom_treeno sensitive capabilityfind_widgetno sensitive capabilityfollow_linkno sensitive capabilityget_accessibilityno sensitive capabilityget_consoleno sensitive capabilityget_current_storyno sensitive capabilityget_focusedno sensitive capabilityget_linksno sensitive capabilityget_networkno sensitive capabilityget_propertyno sensitive capabilityget_statusno sensitive capabilityinspect_elementno sensitive capabilitylist_actionsno sensitive capabilitylist_instancesno sensitive capabilitylist_storiesno sensitive capabilitylist_toplevelsno sensitive capabilitynavigateno sensitive capabilityopen_storyno sensitive capabilitypage_screenshotno sensitive capabilitypresent_windowno sensitive capabilityquery_domno sensitive capabilityresize_windowno sensitive capabilityscreenshotno sensitive capabilitysend_keyno sensitive capabilityset_story_argno sensitive capabilityset_viewportno sensitive capabilityswap_cssno sensitive capabilitywait_for_loadno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (41 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 10
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.48.0 latest |
B 89/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.47.0 |
B 89/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-05 |
v0.45.0 |
B 89/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v0.44.0 |
B 89/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-31 |
v0.43.0 |
B 89/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-27 |
Show 5 more versions ↓
v0.42.0 |
B 89/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.41.0 |
B 89/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-22 |
v0.40.0 |
B 89/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-18 |
v0.39.0 |
B 89/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-15 |
v0.38.1 |
B 89/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-14 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @gjsify/devtools-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Devtools 6
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 7 side by side →
Swiss Army knife MCP server — 20+ developer utilities (base64, JWT, UUID, hash, QR codes, regex, timestamps, colors, and more) with zero API keys required
MCP server providing 70+ developer tools - QR codes, PDFs, screenshots, crypto prices, email validation, AI text processing, and more. Use with Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, and other AI coding assistants.
MCP server exposing Foldkit DevTools to AI agents (Claude Code, Cursor, etc.)
Production-grade MCP server that gives AI agents safe access to your local dev environment: filesystem, databases, processes, and OpenAPI specs.
multi-functional MCP-devtools server over SSE
Security scan results for the Devtools (npm) MCP server.
More in Other
A Model Context Protocol server implementation for AdGuard Home that enables AI agents to query and manage DNS records, filtering rules and more
Identity oracle and trust layer for autonomous AI agents. Bidirectional KYA and trust scoring.
MCP server with Airtable integration
A free one-minute reset for people, delivered by AI, with no account or personal data.
Access SEC filings efficiently, save time and tokens, and get cited answers.
A smart [MCP](https://modelcontextprotocol.io) server for [AniList](https://anilist.co) that gets your anime/manga taste - not just API calls.