Devtools (oscarmarin) MCP Server
@oscarmarin/mcp-devtools
npm
v1.0.1
Published by @oscarmarin — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Production-grade MCP server that gives AI agents safe access to your local dev environment: filesystem, databases, processes, and OpenAPI specs.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.cjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.cjs:18`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: = require('yaml'); var child_process = require('child_process'); var util = require('util'); var stdio_js = require('@m
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.cjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:18`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execFile, spawn } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import { StdioServerTransport } from '@modelco
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/index.cjs)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.cjs:835`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const mod = await import(specifier); const exported = mod.default; if (!isToolDefinitionArray(exported
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.cjs
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:806`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const mod = await import(specifier); const exported = mod.default; if (!isToolDefinitionArray(exported
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @oscarmarin/mcp-devtools --onlineOther implementations of Devtools 6
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 7 side by side →
Swiss Army knife MCP server — 20+ developer utilities (base64, JWT, UUID, hash, QR codes, regex, timestamps, colors, and more) with zero API keys required
MCP server providing 70+ developer tools - QR codes, PDFs, screenshots, crypto prices, email validation, AI text processing, and more. Use with Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, and other AI coding assistants.
MCP server exposing Foldkit DevTools to AI agents (Claude Code, Cursor, etc.)
multi-functional MCP-devtools server over SSE
MCP↔devtools bridge for GJS apps — exposes a running app's org.gjsify.Devtools control plane (DBus) to an AI agent as MCP tools
Security scan results for the Devtools (npm) MCP server.
More in Databases
Security scan results for the A5sql MCP server.
Expose AgentsKit tools as an MCP server — use them from Claude Desktop, Cursor, Windsurf, or any MCP host.
MCP server for Aiven cloud data platform - manage PostgreSQL, Kafka, and other services
MCP Server for All-Inkl.com hosting via KAS API
Structured aquarium, marine, terrarium and paludarium data for AI agents.
MCP server that gives your AI agent real vehicle data — specs, representative images, federal recalls, owner complaints, service bulletins, defect investigations, and OBD-II DTC reference — from the CarVector API.