Devtools — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@gjsify/devtools-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@gjsify/devtools-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "@gjsify/devtools-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 89,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (41 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: get_page_info → activate_widget → eval_js. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "get_page_info → activate_widget → eval_js"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"get_page_info"
],
"sources": [
"dump_tree",
"activate_widget",
"dump_gsettings",
"dump_css"
],
"sinks": [
"eval_js"
],
"path": [
"get_page_info",
"activate_widget",
"eval_js"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "get_page_info",
"to": "activate_widget",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "activate_widget",
"to": "eval_js",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
}
],
"wired": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"eval_js\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"eval_js\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"eval\" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "eval_js"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"eval_js\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"eval_js\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "eval_js"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"get_page_info"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"dump_tree",
"activate_widget",
"dump_gsettings",
"dump_css"
],
"externalSink": [
"eval_js"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"get_page_info",
"activate_widget",
"eval_js"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: get_page_info → activate_widget → eval_js."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "get_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "screenshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_actions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "activate_action",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "change_action_state",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "present_window",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "resize_window",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_toplevels",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dump_tree",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"dump\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_property",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_focused",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_widget",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "activate_widget",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"dump\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "send_key",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dump_gsettings",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"dump\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "dump_css",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"dump\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "swap_css",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_instances",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "navigate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_page_info",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"get_page\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "page_screenshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_viewport",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "eval_js",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"eval\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_stories",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "open_story",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_current_story",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_story_arg",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_links",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "follow_link",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "query_dom",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wait_for_load",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_console",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "inspect_element",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dom_tree",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_network",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_accessibility",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cdp_send",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cdp_discover_targets",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cdp_connect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cdp_drain_events",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "device_screenshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "0e38b7cb6ced3fd9e0e23ba2207ea4e92dfde2e5483725bad207fbd65e1f5159",
"stats": {
"tools": 41,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 1,
"high": 1,
"medium": 0,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}