Fittok — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "fittok",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "fittok"
},
"server": {
"name": "fittok"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (20 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (plugin/hooks/fittok_hook.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`plugin/hooks/fittok_hook.py:71`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "plugin/hooks/fittok_hook.py"
},
"evidence": "try: proc = subprocess.run( [fittok_bin, \"query\", cwd, prompt, \"--budget\", budget],",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "plugin/hooks/fittok_hook.py",
"line": 71,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/fittok/graphify.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/fittok/graphify.py:163`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/fittok/graphify.py"
},
"evidence": "try: mod = __import__(module_name) except ImportError: logger.warning(\"tree-sitter language pac",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "src/fittok/graphify.py",
"line": 163,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (lib/vis-9.1.2/vis-network.min.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`lib/vis-9.1.2/vis-network.min.js:26`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "lib/vis-9.1.2/vis-network.min.js"
},
"evidence": "is.regeneratorRuntime=e:Function(\"r\",\"regeneratorRuntime = r\")(e)}}(jk);var Rk=jk.exports,Lk=xt,Hk=Rt,Wk=R,qk=Bi,Vk=n.Ty",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "lib/vis-9.1.2/vis-network.min.js",
"line": 26,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (lib/tom-select/tom-select.complete.min.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`lib/tom-select/tom-select.complete.min.js:120`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "lib/tom-select/tom-select.complete.min.js"
},
"evidence": "t)) for(;i=n.shift();)s.require(i)}loadPlugin(t){var i=this,s=i.plugins,n=e.plugins[t] if(!e.plugins.hasOwnProperty(t))t",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "lib/tom-select/tom-select.complete.min.js",
"line": 120,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "parse_codebase_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "query_graph_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "optimize_context_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "optimize_context_stream",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "optimize_context_batch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "optimize_context_structured",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "parse_codebase_stream_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "watch_start_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "watch_stop_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_graph_stats_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "reset_graph_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "show_graph_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "diff_graph_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scrub_text_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scrub_file_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_pii_patterns_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_pii_pattern_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clear_cache_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cache_stats_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "launch_ui_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "cd43639fb5005395ea7d5fbf4e8b8ed639d04b57c8baadda3647bb0fad5d4624",
"stats": {
"tools": 20,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 1,
"medium": 1,
"low": 2,
"info": 0
}
}
}