Fittok MCP Server

fittok PyPI v0.10.1

Published by likhithreddy — no publish provenance and no vendor-owned scope, so the publisher could not be verified. The repository link below is self-declared.

Trust grade
D
65/100
Last scanned
Trust
D · 65/100
How safe the published surface and source look. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
D Why this grade 100 − 35.1 = 65/100

Every server starts at 100. These are the exact deductions the deterministic engine applied — each one reproducible, none of it an opinion or an LLM's guess:

PointsWhat was foundCategory
−33 Hardcoded AWS access key id in server code ×2 MTC-SRC-008 exfiltration
−2.1 Package has no source repository MTC-SUP-011 supply-chain

Grade capped: 2 confirmed high findings → grade capped at D. A hard gate overrides the point total — no amount of clean surface buys back a confirmed catastrophe.

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind the deduction.

Findings 7

high Hardcoded AWS access key id in server code (tests/test_pii_scrubber.py)MTC-SRC-008

A live-looking AWS access key id is hardcoded in `tests/test_pii_scrubber.py:21`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.

Evidence: AWS access key id: AKIA…(redacted)

Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.

Location: server tests/test_pii_scrubber.py

high Hardcoded AWS access key id in server code (tests/test_server_v2.py)MTC-SRC-008

A live-looking AWS access key id is hardcoded in `tests/test_server_v2.py:127`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.

Evidence: AWS access key id: AKIA…(redacted)

Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.

Location: server tests/test_server_v2.py

high Dynamic code execution in server code (lib/vis-9.1.2/vis-network.min.js)MTC-SRC-001

In the server's implementation (`lib/vis-9.1.2/vis-network.min.js:26`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: Function("

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server lib/vis-9.1.2/vis-network.min.js

high Shell/command execution in server code (plugin/hooks/fittok_hook.py)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`plugin/hooks/fittok_hook.py:71`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: subprocess.run(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server plugin/hooks/fittok_hook.py

medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (lib/tom-select/tom-select.complete.min.js)MTC-SRC-005

In the server's implementation (`lib/tom-select/tom-select.complete.min.js:120`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: require(i)

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server lib/tom-select/tom-select.complete.min.js

medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/fittok/graphify.py)MTC-SRC-005

In the server's implementation (`src/fittok/graphify.py:163`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: __import__(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/fittok/graphify.py

low Package has no source repositoryMTC-SUP-011

"fittok" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.

Fix: Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.

Location: package fittok

What this scan could not see

Versions

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v0.10.1 latest D 65/100 7 1.5.0 2026-07-22

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MCP Trust Score: D · 65/100
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