Fittok MCP Server
fittok
PyPI
v0.11.1
Published by likhithreddy — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server that retrieves the most relevant source code for a query, within a token budget
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (plugin/hooks/fittok_hook.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`plugin/hooks/fittok_hook.py:71`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.run( [fittok_bin, "query", cwd, prompt, "--budget", budget],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server plugin/hooks/fittok_hook.py
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/fittok/graphify.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`src/fittok/graphify.py:163`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: mod = __import__(module_name) except ImportError: logger.warning("tree-sitter language pac
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/fittok/graphify.py
low Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (lib/vis-9.1.2/vis-network.min.js)MTC-SRC-001
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`lib/vis-9.1.2/vis-network.min.js:26`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: is.regeneratorRuntime=e:Function("r","regeneratorRuntime = r")(e)}}(jk);var Rk=jk.exports,Lk=xt,Hk=Rt,Wk=R,qk=Bi,Vk=n.Ty
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/vis-9.1.2/vis-network.min.js
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (lib/tom-select/tom-select.complete.min.js)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`lib/tom-select/tom-select.complete.min.js:120`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: t)) for(;i=n.shift();)s.require(i)}loadPlugin(t){var i=this,s=i.plugins,n=e.plugins[t] if(!e.plugins.hasOwnProperty(t))t
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/tom-select/tom-select.complete.min.js
Tools 20
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
add_pii_pattern_toolno sensitive capabilitycache_stats_toolno sensitive capabilityclear_cache_toolno sensitive capabilitydiff_graph_toolno sensitive capabilityget_graph_stats_toolno sensitive capabilitylaunch_ui_toolno sensitive capabilitylist_pii_patterns_toolno sensitive capabilityoptimize_context_batchno sensitive capabilityoptimize_context_streamno sensitive capabilityoptimize_context_structuredno sensitive capability
Show 10 more tools ↓
optimize_context_toolno sensitive capabilityparse_codebase_stream_toolno sensitive capabilityparse_codebase_toolno sensitive capabilityquery_graph_toolno sensitive capabilityreset_graph_toolno sensitive capabilityscrub_file_toolno sensitive capabilityscrub_text_toolno sensitive capabilityshow_graph_toolno sensitive capabilitywatch_start_toolno sensitive capabilitywatch_stop_toolno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (20 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.11.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.11.0 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
v0.10.1 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan fittok --online --registry pypiMore in AI, Memory & Reasoning
FDA device & vehicle recall risk for AI agents: recall history, MAUDE trend, risk score.
Open-source MCP server exposing Agent402.Tools' catalog — 500+ strong: 400+ self-hostable tools + 100 multi-tool skill packs (security-audit, trend-analysis, structured-scrape, decode-blob, forecasting-bake-off) for AI agents — browser, web search & answe
Zero-dependency MCP server that gives AI agents a self-updating project memory in AGENTS.md. Returns merge instructions instead of mutating state, so every change is a reviewable diff.
MCP Apps UI resources and server helpers for n8n
MCP server providing comprehensive access to BookStack knowledge management system
MCP server for tracking achievements with STAR methodology