Adeu (dealfluence) MCP Server
adeu
PyPI
v3.0.2
Published by dealfluence — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Automated DOCX Redlining Engine
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/adeu/mcp_components/shared.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/adeu/mcp_components/shared.py:113`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: : git_sha = subprocess.check_output( ["git", "rev-parse", "--short", "HEAD"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/adeu/mcp_components/shared.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/adeu/mcp_components/tools/document.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/adeu/mcp_components/tools/document.py:1288`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: = "darwin": subprocess.run(["open", str(p)], check=True) else: subprocess.run(["xdg-open
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/adeu/mcp_components/tools/document.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/patch_smithery_mcpb.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/patch_smithery_mcpb.py:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: schemas...") proc = subprocess.Popen( ["uv", "run", "adeu-server"], stdin=subprocess.PIPE, s
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/patch_smithery_mcpb.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_cli_encoding.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_cli_encoding.py:52`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: v_overrides) return subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-m", "adeu.cli", *args], capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_cli_encoding.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_corpus_validation.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_corpus_validation.py:47`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rocess[str]: return subprocess.run( [sys.executable, str(REPO_ROOT / "scripts" / "fetch_corpus.py"), *args],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_corpus_validation.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_cross_platform_consistency.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_cross_platform_consistency.py:81`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: lchain.md. result = subprocess.run( ["xmllint", "--noout", str(out)], capture_output=True, text=True, encodi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_cross_platform_consistency.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_json_unicode.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_json_unicode.py:150`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: NG": "utf-8"} res = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-m", "adeu.cli", "extract", str(docx_path), "--json"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_json_unicode.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_libreoffice_probe_isolation.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_libreoffice_probe_isolation.py:144`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: append( subprocess.Popen( [sys.executable, str(script), str(src), str(tmp_path / f"o
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_libreoffice_probe_isolation.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_regressions.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_regressions.py:241`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cess diff_output = subprocess.check_output(["uv", "run", "adeu", "diff", str(d1_path), str(d2_path)]).decode("utf-8
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_regressions.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_repro_fte_2026_07_16.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_repro_fte_2026_07_16.py:157`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: NUTF8": "0"} proc = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-m", "adeu.cli", "extract", "definitely_missing_file_x
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_repro_fte_2026_07_16.py
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 10
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v3.0.2 latest |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-28 |
v3.0.1 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-27 |
v3.0.0 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v2.4.1 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-19 |
v2.4.0 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-14 |
Show 5 more versions ↓
v2.3.1 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-13 |
v2.2.0 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-12 |
v2.0.0 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-09 |
v1.31.0 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-04 |
v1.30.0 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan adeu --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Adeu 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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