Adeu — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "adeu",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "adeu"
},
"server": {
"name": "adeu"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": false,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/adeu/mcp_components/shared.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/adeu/mcp_components/shared.py:113`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/adeu/mcp_components/shared.py"
},
"evidence": ": git_sha = subprocess.check_output( [\"git\", \"rev-parse\", \"--short\", \"HEAD\"],",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/adeu/mcp_components/shared.py",
"line": 113,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/adeu/mcp_components/tools/document.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/adeu/mcp_components/tools/document.py:1288`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/adeu/mcp_components/tools/document.py"
},
"evidence": "= \"darwin\": subprocess.run([\"open\", str(p)], check=True) else: subprocess.run([\"xdg-open",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/adeu/mcp_components/tools/document.py",
"line": 1288,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/patch_smithery_mcpb.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/patch_smithery_mcpb.py:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/patch_smithery_mcpb.py"
},
"evidence": "schemas...\") proc = subprocess.Popen( [\"uv\", \"run\", \"adeu-server\"], stdin=subprocess.PIPE, s",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/patch_smithery_mcpb.py",
"line": 11,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_cli_encoding.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_cli_encoding.py:52`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_cli_encoding.py"
},
"evidence": "v_overrides) return subprocess.run( [sys.executable, \"-m\", \"adeu.cli\", *args], capture_output=True,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_cli_encoding.py",
"line": 52,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_corpus_validation.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_corpus_validation.py:47`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_corpus_validation.py"
},
"evidence": "rocess[str]: return subprocess.run( [sys.executable, str(REPO_ROOT / \"scripts\" / \"fetch_corpus.py\"), *args],",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_corpus_validation.py",
"line": 47,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_cross_platform_consistency.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_cross_platform_consistency.py:81`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_cross_platform_consistency.py"
},
"evidence": "lchain.md. result = subprocess.run( [\"xmllint\", \"--noout\", str(out)], capture_output=True, text=True, encodi",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_cross_platform_consistency.py",
"line": 81,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_json_unicode.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_json_unicode.py:150`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_json_unicode.py"
},
"evidence": "NG\": \"utf-8\"} res = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, \"-m\", \"adeu.cli\", \"extract\", str(docx_path), \"--json\"],",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_json_unicode.py",
"line": 150,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_libreoffice_probe_isolation.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_libreoffice_probe_isolation.py:144`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_libreoffice_probe_isolation.py"
},
"evidence": "append( subprocess.Popen( [sys.executable, str(script), str(src), str(tmp_path / f\"o",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_libreoffice_probe_isolation.py",
"line": 144,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_regressions.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_regressions.py:241`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_regressions.py"
},
"evidence": "cess diff_output = subprocess.check_output([\"uv\", \"run\", \"adeu\", \"diff\", str(d1_path), str(d2_path)]).decode(\"utf-8",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_regressions.py",
"line": 241,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_repro_fte_2026_07_16.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_repro_fte_2026_07_16.py:157`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_repro_fte_2026_07_16.py"
},
"evidence": "NUTF8\": \"0\"} proc = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, \"-m\", \"adeu.cli\", \"extract\", \"definitely_missing_file_x",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_repro_fte_2026_07_16.py",
"line": 157,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [],
"surfaceDigest": "d7d095f2e449ddbf984f9c91d56dc6988d3b9abd9465328b372c4b5e3fa1def4",
"stats": {
"tools": 0,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 2,
"medium": 0,
"low": 8,
"info": 0
}
}
}