Adeu (adeu) MCP Server

@adeu/mcp-server npm v1.28.0 Source verified

Published by dealfluence — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.

Trust grade
A
93/100
Last scanned
Trust
A · 93/100
How safe the published surface and source look. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
A Why this grade 100 − 6.7 = 93/100

Every server starts at 100. These are the exact deductions the deterministic engine applied — each one reproducible, none of it an opinion or an LLM's guess:

PointsWhat was foundCategory
−6.7 Possible combosquat of mcp ×4 MTC-SUP-006 supply-chain

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind the deduction.

Findings 12

high Shell/command execution in server code (scripts/verify-reasoning-order.mjs)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`scripts/verify-reasoning-order.mjs:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: child_process

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server scripts/verify-reasoning-order.mjs

high Shell/command execution in server code (src/mcp.bugs.test.ts)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`src/mcp.bugs.test.ts:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: child_process

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/mcp.bugs.test.ts

high Shell/command execution in server code (src/mcp.schema-gaps.test.ts)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`src/mcp.schema-gaps.test.ts:23`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: child_process

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/mcp.schema-gaps.test.ts

high Shell/command execution in server code (src/parity_live.test.ts)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`src/parity_live.test.ts:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: child_process

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/parity_live.test.ts

high Shell/command execution in server code (src/repro.feedback.test.ts)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`src/repro.feedback.test.ts:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: child_process

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/repro.feedback.test.ts

high Shell/command execution in server code (src/repro.qa_2026_07_18.test.ts)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`src/repro.qa_2026_07_18.test.ts:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: child_process

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/repro.qa_2026_07_18.test.ts

high Shell/command execution in server code (src/repro.qa_report_v8.test.ts)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`src/repro.qa_report_v8.test.ts:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: child_process

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/repro.qa_report_v8.test.ts

high Shell/command execution in server code (tsup.config.ts)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`tsup.config.ts:25`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: child_process

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server tsup.config.ts

medium Possible combosquat of mcpMTC-SUP-006

"@adeu/mcp-server" is "mcp" with a decorative suffix — a common combosquat pattern.

Fix: Confirm you meant "mcp". Install packages only from their documented, official name.

Location: package @adeu/mcp-server

medium Possible combosquat of @playwright/mcpMTC-SUP-006

"@adeu/mcp-server" is "@playwright/mcp" with a decorative suffix — a common combosquat pattern.

Fix: Confirm you meant "@playwright/mcp". Install packages only from their documented, official name.

Location: package @adeu/mcp-server

medium Possible combosquat of @stripe/mcpMTC-SUP-006

"@adeu/mcp-server" is "@stripe/mcp" with a decorative suffix — a common combosquat pattern.

Fix: Confirm you meant "@stripe/mcp". Install packages only from their documented, official name.

Location: package @adeu/mcp-server

medium Possible combosquat of @browsermcp/mcpMTC-SUP-006

"@adeu/mcp-server" is "@browsermcp/mcp" with a decorative suffix — a common combosquat pattern.

Fix: Confirm you meant "@browsermcp/mcp". Install packages only from their documented, official name.

Location: package @adeu/mcp-server

What this scan could not see

Versions

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.28.0 latest A 93/100 12 1.5.0 2026-07-22

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MCP Trust Score: A · 93/100
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