Zyphr Dev MCP Server
@zyphr-dev/mcp-server
npm
v0.1.16
Published by @zyphr-dev — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Model Context Protocol server for Zyphr — wraps the Zyphr API as MCP tools for AI clients
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([get_inbound_attachment_url, get_organization, get_end_user, get_template]) co-exist with external-action tools ([verify_domain, send_email, send_sms, create_webhook]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [get_inbound_attachment_url, get_organization, get_end_user, get_template] → sinks [verify_domain, send_email, send_sms, create_webhook]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow get_inbound_attachment_url → verify_domain
Tools 42
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_webhooknetwork egressget_end_useringests untrusted inputget_inbound_attachment_urlingests untrusted inputget_organizationingests untrusted inputget_templateingests untrusted inputsend_emailnetwork egresssend_smsnetwork egressverify_domainnetwork egressadd_domainno sensitive capabilityadd_organization_memberno sensitive capability
Show 32 more tools ↓
create_organizationno sensitive capabilitycreate_subscriberno sensitive capabilitycreate_templateno sensitive capabilitydelete_end_userno sensitive capabilityfind_subscriberno sensitive capabilityget_domainno sensitive capabilityget_end_user_by_emailno sensitive capabilityget_end_user_claimsno sensitive capabilityget_inbound_emailno sensitive capabilityget_quickstart_for_channelno sensitive capabilityget_sdk_install_for_languageno sensitive capabilityget_webhook_deliveriesno sensitive capabilityinvite_end_userno sensitive capabilitylist_domainsno sensitive capabilitylist_end_usersno sensitive capabilitylist_inbound_emailsno sensitive capabilitylist_organization_membersno sensitive capabilitylist_organizationsno sensitive capabilitylist_organizations_for_userno sensitive capabilitylist_subscribersno sensitive capabilitylist_templatesno sensitive capabilitylist_webhooksno sensitive capabilityremove_organization_memberno sensitive capabilityrender_templateno sensitive capabilitysend_inbox_messageno sensitive capabilitysend_pushno sensitive capabilityset_end_user_claimsno sensitive capabilityset_subscriber_preferencesno sensitive capabilityupdate_end_userno sensitive capabilityupdate_organizationno sensitive capabilityupdate_organization_member_roleno sensitive capabilityupdate_subscriberno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (42 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 7
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.16 latest |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.1.15 |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-24 |
v0.1.14 |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-20 |
v0.1.13 |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-18 |
v0.1.11 |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-31 |
Show 2 more versions ↓
v0.1.8 |
A 95/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-28 |
v0.1.7 |
B 89/100 | 6 | 1.3.1 | 2026-07-21 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @zyphr-dev/mcp-server --onlineMore in API Development
Adapters for the FrontMCP framework
Transcend MCP Server — Admin tools.
Transcend MCP Server — Assessments tools.
MCP Server for Bling
MCP Server for Blogger API
Official MCP server for Brilliant Directories — manage members, posts, leads, reviews, and more.