Knowledge Keeper MCP Server
@zsc-glitch/knowledge-keeper-mcp
npm
v1.7.7
Published by @zsc-glitch — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
AI Memory & Knowledge Management MCP Server — 32 tools, BM25 R@5=95%, hybrid search (RRF), knowledge graph, analytics, cloud sync, Obsidian compatible. Works with Claude Code, Cursor, Gemini CLI, Windsurf, hermes-agent.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Shell/command execution in server code (hermes-plugin/knowledge-keeper/__init__.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`hermes-plugin/knowledge-keeper/__init__.py:62`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: self._proc = subprocess.Popen( [MCP_COMMAND, *MCP_ARGS], stdin=subprocess.PIP
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server hermes-plugin/knowledge-keeper/__init__.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (hermes-plugin/knowledge-keeper/cli.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`hermes-plugin/knowledge-keeper/cli.py:66`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["npx", "-y", "@zsc-glitch/knowledge-keeper-mcp"], input
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server hermes-plugin/knowledge-keeper/cli.py
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/cloud-sync.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/cloud-sync.js:298`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch("https://api.knowledge-keeper.dev/v1/license", { headers: { Authorization: `Be
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cloud-sync.js
medium Tool "knowledge_unlink" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "knowledge_unlink" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "unlink" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool knowledge_unlink
low Mutating tool "knowledge_unlink" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "knowledge_unlink" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool knowledge_unlink
Tools 33
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
knowledge_unlinkwrites filesknowledge_analytics_insightsno sensitive capabilityknowledge_analytics_overviewno sensitive capabilityknowledge_analytics_timelineno sensitive capabilityknowledge_batchno sensitive capabilityknowledge_bm25_searchno sensitive capabilityknowledge_bm25_statsno sensitive capabilityknowledge_cloud_syncno sensitive capabilityknowledge_contextno sensitive capabilityknowledge_deleteno sensitive capability
Show 23 more tools ↓
knowledge_duplicatesno sensitive capabilityknowledge_exportno sensitive capabilityknowledge_getno sensitive capabilityknowledge_get_linkedno sensitive capabilityknowledge_graphno sensitive capabilityknowledge_graph_buildno sensitive capabilityknowledge_graph_queryno sensitive capabilityknowledge_graph_visualizeno sensitive capabilityknowledge_hybrid_searchno sensitive capabilityknowledge_importno sensitive capabilityknowledge_licenseno sensitive capabilityknowledge_linkno sensitive capabilityknowledge_mergeno sensitive capabilityknowledge_recentno sensitive capabilityknowledge_reviewno sensitive capabilityknowledge_saveno sensitive capabilityknowledge_searchno sensitive capabilityknowledge_semantic_searchno sensitive capabilityknowledge_syncno sensitive capabilityknowledge_sync_statusno sensitive capabilityknowledge_tagsno sensitive capabilityknowledge_updateno sensitive capabilityknowledge_versionsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (33 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.7.7 latest |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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