Zpl Engine — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "zpl-engine-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "zpl-engine-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "zpl-engine-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 96,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "moderate",
"label": "capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "moderate",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service"
],
"tags": [
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (69 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/eval-client.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/eval-client.js:14`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/eval-client.js"
},
"evidence": "; const res = await fetch(\"https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages\", { method: \"POST\", headers: {",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/eval-client.js",
"line": 14,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/index.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:661`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index.js"
},
"evidence": "const res = await fetch(\"https://registry.npmjs.org/zpl-engine-mcp/latest\", { signal: AbortSignal.",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/index.js",
"line": 661,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/setup.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/setup.js:35`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/setup.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from \"node:child_process\"; import { createInterface } from \"node:readline\"; import { getMcpPackageVersion }",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/setup.js",
"line": 35,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "zpl_compute",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_sweep",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_matrix",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_analyze",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_domains",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_plans",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_watchlist",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_report",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_versus",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_balance_compare",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_simulate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_leaderboard",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_chart",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_teach",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_alert",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_model_bias",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_dataset_audit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_prompt_test",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_benchmark",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_debate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_news_bias",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_review_bias",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_whale_check",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_defi_risk",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_liquidity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_tokenomics",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_consistency_test",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_sycophancy_score",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_refusal_balance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_language_equity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_persona_drift",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_safety_boundary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_hallucination_consistency",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_emotional_stability",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_market_scan",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_portfolio",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_fear_greed",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_forex_pair",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_sector_bias",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_macro",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_correlation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_loot_table",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_matchmaking",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_economy_check",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_pvp_balance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_gacha_audit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_rng_test",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_about",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_quota",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_score_only",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_diagnose",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_validate_input",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_batch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_export",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_usage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_account",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_vuln_map",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_risk_score",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_compliance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_decide",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_balance_check",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_compare",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_balance_pair",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_rank",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_balance_rank",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_check_response",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zpl_explain",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "86810112174322e1e6d8612cd3306e59c9c11af674e61b232c532134c9bd3ebd",
"stats": {
"tools": 69,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 0,
"medium": 2,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}