Zpl Engine MCP Server
zpl-engine-mcp
npm
v4.3.0
Published by cicicalex — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for the ZPL stability engine — AIN bias detection & neutrality scoring for finance, gaming, AI/ML, security, crypto. 68 tools across 11 categories. Plug into Claude Desktop / Cursor / Windsurf in 10 seconds via `npx zpl-engine-mcp setup`. Free
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/eval-client.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/eval-client.js:14`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; const res = await fetch("https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages", { method: "POST", headers: {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/eval-client.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:661`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res = await fetch("https://registry.npmjs.org/zpl-engine-mcp/latest", { signal: AbortSignal.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/setup.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/setup.js:35`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { createInterface } from "node:readline"; import { getMcpPackageVersion }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/setup.js
Tools 69
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
zpl_aboutno sensitive capabilityzpl_accountno sensitive capabilityzpl_alertno sensitive capabilityzpl_analyzeno sensitive capabilityzpl_balance_checkno sensitive capabilityzpl_balance_compareno sensitive capabilityzpl_balance_pairno sensitive capabilityzpl_balance_rankno sensitive capabilityzpl_batchno sensitive capabilityzpl_benchmarkno sensitive capability
Show 59 more tools ↓
zpl_chartno sensitive capabilityzpl_check_responseno sensitive capabilityzpl_compareno sensitive capabilityzpl_complianceno sensitive capabilityzpl_computeno sensitive capabilityzpl_consistency_testno sensitive capabilityzpl_correlationno sensitive capabilityzpl_dataset_auditno sensitive capabilityzpl_debateno sensitive capabilityzpl_decideno sensitive capabilityzpl_defi_riskno sensitive capabilityzpl_diagnoseno sensitive capabilityzpl_domainsno sensitive capabilityzpl_economy_checkno sensitive capabilityzpl_emotional_stabilityno sensitive capabilityzpl_explainno sensitive capabilityzpl_exportno sensitive capabilityzpl_fear_greedno sensitive capabilityzpl_forex_pairno sensitive capabilityzpl_gacha_auditno sensitive capabilityzpl_hallucination_consistencyno sensitive capabilityzpl_healthno sensitive capabilityzpl_historyno sensitive capabilityzpl_language_equityno sensitive capabilityzpl_leaderboardno sensitive capabilityzpl_liquidityno sensitive capabilityzpl_loot_tableno sensitive capabilityzpl_macrono sensitive capabilityzpl_market_scanno sensitive capabilityzpl_matchmakingno sensitive capabilityzpl_matrixno sensitive capabilityzpl_model_biasno sensitive capabilityzpl_news_biasno sensitive capabilityzpl_persona_driftno sensitive capabilityzpl_plansno sensitive capabilityzpl_portfoliono sensitive capabilityzpl_prompt_testno sensitive capabilityzpl_pvp_balanceno sensitive capabilityzpl_quotano sensitive capabilityzpl_rankno sensitive capabilityzpl_refusal_balanceno sensitive capabilityzpl_reportno sensitive capabilityzpl_review_biasno sensitive capabilityzpl_risk_scoreno sensitive capabilityzpl_rng_testno sensitive capabilityzpl_safety_boundaryno sensitive capabilityzpl_score_onlyno sensitive capabilityzpl_sector_biasno sensitive capabilityzpl_simulateno sensitive capabilityzpl_sweepno sensitive capabilityzpl_sycophancy_scoreno sensitive capabilityzpl_teachno sensitive capabilityzpl_tokenomicsno sensitive capabilityzpl_usageno sensitive capabilityzpl_validate_inputno sensitive capabilityzpl_versusno sensitive capabilityzpl_vuln_mapno sensitive capabilityzpl_watchlistno sensitive capabilityzpl_whale_checkno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (69 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v4.3.0 latest |
A 96/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v4.2.1 |
A 96/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-02 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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