Yt Dlp (yt-dlp) MCP Server
yt-dlp
PyPI
v2026.7.4
Published by yt-dlp — no publish provenance and no vendor-owned scope, so the publisher could not be verified. The repository link below is self-declared.
Every server starts at 100. These are the exact deductions the deterministic engine applied — each one reproducible, none of it an opinion or an LLM's guess:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −47.3 | Hardcoded JSON Web Token in server code ×7 MTC-SRC-008 | exfiltration |
| −30 | Obfuscated / encoded payload in server code ×5 MTC-SRC-004 | injection |
| −6.3 | Unsafe deserialization MTC-SRC-007 | permissions |
| −2.1 | Package has no source repository MTC-SUP-011 | supply-chain |
Grade capped: 7 confirmed high findings → grade capped at D. A hard gate overrides the point total — no amount of clean surface buys back a confirmed catastrophe.
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind the deduction.
Findings 30
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (devscripts/setup_variables.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`devscripts/setup_variables.py:133`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: dict(os.environ)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server devscripts/setup_variables.py
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (yt_dlp/YoutubeDL.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`yt_dlp/YoutubeDL.py:239`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: .netrc
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server yt_dlp/YoutubeDL.py
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (yt_dlp/__init__.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`yt_dlp/__init__.py:209`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: .netrc
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server yt_dlp/__init__.py
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (yt_dlp/extractor/common.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`yt_dlp/extractor/common.py:1403`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: .netrc
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server yt_dlp/extractor/common.py
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (yt_dlp/options.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`yt_dlp/options.py:834`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: .netrc
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server yt_dlp/options.py
high Hardcoded JSON Web Token in server code (test/test_utils.py)MTC-SRC-008
A live-looking JSON Web Token is hardcoded in `test/test_utils.py:2262`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.
Evidence: JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server test/test_utils.py
high Hardcoded JSON Web Token in server code (yt_dlp/extractor/adultswim.py)MTC-SRC-008
A live-looking JSON Web Token is hardcoded in `yt_dlp/extractor/adultswim.py:87`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.
Evidence: JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server yt_dlp/extractor/adultswim.py
high Hardcoded JSON Web Token in server code (yt_dlp/extractor/aenetworks.py)MTC-SRC-008
A live-looking JSON Web Token is hardcoded in `yt_dlp/extractor/aenetworks.py:26`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.
Evidence: JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server yt_dlp/extractor/aenetworks.py
high Hardcoded JSON Web Token in server code (yt_dlp/extractor/blackboardcollaborate.py)MTC-SRC-008
A live-looking JSON Web Token is hardcoded in `yt_dlp/extractor/blackboardcollaborate.py:159`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.
Evidence: JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server yt_dlp/extractor/blackboardcollaborate.py
high Hardcoded JSON Web Token in server code (yt_dlp/extractor/cloudflarestream.py)MTC-SRC-008
A live-looking JSON Web Token is hardcoded in `yt_dlp/extractor/cloudflarestream.py:46`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.
Evidence: JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server yt_dlp/extractor/cloudflarestream.py
high Hardcoded Google API key in server code (yt_dlp/extractor/cybrary.py)MTC-SRC-008
A live-looking Google API key is hardcoded in `yt_dlp/extractor/cybrary.py:12`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.
Evidence: Google API key: AIza…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server yt_dlp/extractor/cybrary.py
high Hardcoded JSON Web Token in server code (yt_dlp/extractor/espn.py)MTC-SRC-008
A live-looking JSON Web Token is hardcoded in `yt_dlp/extractor/espn.py:332`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.
Evidence: JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server yt_dlp/extractor/espn.py
high Obfuscated / encoded payload in server code (test/test_aes.py)MTC-SRC-004
In the server's implementation (`test/test_aes.py:62`): Decoding an encoded blob and executing it is how malicious logic is hidden from human review of the source. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: \x03\xc7\xdd\xd4\x8e\xb3\xbc\x1a
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server test/test_aes.py
high Obfuscated / encoded payload in server code (test/test_cookies.py)MTC-SRC-004
In the server's implementation (`test/test_cookies.py:118`): Decoding an encoded blob and executing it is how malicious logic is hidden from human review of the source. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: \x9f\x82\xba\xfe\xa1\xed\xb9\xf1
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server test/test_cookies.py
high Obfuscated / encoded payload in server code (test/test_jsc/test_ejs_integration.py)MTC-SRC-004
In the server's implementation (`test/test_jsc/test_ejs_integration.py:65`): Decoding an encoded blob and executing it is how malicious logic is hidden from human review of the source. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: \x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19\x20\x21\x22\x23\x24\x25\x26\x27\x28\x29\x30\x31\x32\x33\x34\x35\x36\x37\x38\x39\x40\x41\x42
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server test/test_jsc/test_ejs_integration.py
high Obfuscated / encoded payload in server code (test/test_utils.py)MTC-SRC-004
In the server's implementation (`test/test_utils.py:858`): Decoding an encoded blob and executing it is how malicious logic is hidden from human review of the source. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: \xd1\x82\xd0\xb5\xd1\x81\xd1\x82
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server test/test_utils.py
high Obfuscated / encoded payload in server code (yt_dlp/extractor/anvato.py)MTC-SRC-004
In the server's implementation (`yt_dlp/extractor/anvato.py:31`): Decoding an encoded blob and executing it is how malicious logic is hidden from human review of the source. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: \x31\xc2\x42\x84\x9e\x73\xa0\xce
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server yt_dlp/extractor/anvato.py
high Dynamic code execution in server code (devscripts/utils.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`devscripts/utils.py:30`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: exec(compile(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server devscripts/utils.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (devscripts/generate_aes_testdata.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`devscripts/generate_aes_testdata.py:24`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.Popen(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server devscripts/generate_aes_testdata.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (devscripts/install_deps.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`devscripts/install_deps.py:105`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.call(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server devscripts/install_deps.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (devscripts/run_tests.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`devscripts/run_tests.py:65`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.call(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server devscripts/run_tests.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (devscripts/utils.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`devscripts/utils.py:30`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: exec(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server devscripts/utils.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (test/test_overwrites.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`test/test_overwrites.py:26`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.Popen(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server test/test_overwrites.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (test/test_utils.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`test/test_utils.py:2232`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: shell=True
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server test/test_utils.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (test/test_verbose_output.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`test/test_verbose_output.py:18`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.Popen(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server test/test_verbose_output.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (yt_dlp/YoutubeDL.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`yt_dlp/YoutubeDL.py:1481`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: shell=True
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server yt_dlp/YoutubeDL.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (yt_dlp/extractor/common.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`yt_dlp/extractor/common.py:1395`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: shell=True
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server yt_dlp/extractor/common.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (yt_dlp/update.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`yt_dlp/update.py:561`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: shell=True
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server yt_dlp/update.py
medium Unsafe deserialization (test/test_utils.py)MTC-SRC-007
In the server's implementation (`test/test_utils.py:2199`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: pickle.loads(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server test/test_utils.py
low Package has no source repositoryMTC-SUP-011
"yt-dlp" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.
Fix: Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.
Location: package yt-dlp
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2026.7.4 latest |
F 14/100 | 30 | 1.5.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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