Adobe (ajsmonty) MCP Server
@ajsmonty/adobe-mcp
npm
v1.1.2
Published by @ajsmonty — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Adobe CC apps (AE, PS, AI, Premiere, Character Animator) on macOS
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Tool "run_script" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "run_script" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "run_script" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool run_script
high Shell/command execution in server code (core/bridge.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`core/bridge.mjs:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import fs from "node:fs"; import os from "node:os"; import path from "node:path"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server core/bridge.mjs
low Mutating tool "run_script" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "run_script" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool run_script
Tools 28
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
ai_exportnetwork egressrun_scriptruns code / shellae_get_stateno sensitive capabilityae_render_compno sensitive capabilityae_run_extendscriptno sensitive capabilityae_save_frameno sensitive capabilityai_get_stateno sensitive capabilityai_run_extendscriptno sensitive capabilityai_save_previewno sensitive capabilitych_build_puppetno sensitive capability
Show 18 more tools ↓
ch_taxonomyno sensitive capabilityhandoff_import_to_aeno sensitive capabilityhandoff_place_in_psno sensitive capabilityknowledge_addno sensitive capabilityknowledge_searchno sensitive capabilitylist_scriptsno sensitive capabilityppro_export_sequenceno sensitive capabilityppro_get_stateno sensitive capabilityppro_import_ae_compno sensitive capabilityppro_import_mediano sensitive capabilityppro_run_extendscriptno sensitive capabilityppro_save_frameno sensitive capabilityps_exportno sensitive capabilityps_get_stateno sensitive capabilityps_run_actionno sensitive capabilityps_run_extendscriptno sensitive capabilityps_save_previewno sensitive capabilityworkflow_assetsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (28 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.1.2 latest |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @ajsmonty/adobe-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Adobe 2
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 3 side by side →
Full Adobe Creative Cloud automation for Claude via MCP — 45 tools for Photoshop, Illustrator, Premiere Pro, After Effects, InDesign, Animate & more
Full Creative Cloud automation for Claude via the Model Context Protocol
More in Design & Media
Turn designs into shipped parts: quote 3D printing, CNC, and decals, then check out.
Aleph's official SiliconFlow media-generation MCP server (image / video / TTS)
MCP server for image generation using Google Gemini AI
Ambience AI MCP Server - Generate images, videos, and audio through Model Context Protocol
MCP server exposing every endpoint of the AstroWay Calculation API as tools — natal, synastry, transits, Vedic dashas, Tarot, Numerology, Human Design, AI horoscopes — for Claude Desktop, Cursor and any MCP-compatible AI agent.
Audio-guide and trip-planning tools for 1,100+ cities from Audiala. Free, no API key.