Yocoolab — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@yocoolab/mcp-server",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@yocoolab/mcp-server"
},
"server": {
"name": "@yocoolab/mcp-server"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (22 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/hook-installer.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/hook-installer.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/hook-installer.js"
},
"evidence": "\"node:os\")); const node_child_process_1 = require(\"node:child_process\"); const HOOK_SCRIPT = node_path_1.default.resolve",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/hook-installer.js",
"line": 10,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/http-bridge.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/http-bridge.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/http-bridge.js"
},
"evidence": "ode:path\")); const node_child_process_1 = require(\"node:child_process\"); const uuid_1 = require(\"uuid\"); const activity_",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/http-bridge.js",
"line": 10,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:106`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } = require('child_process'); const ghToken = execSync('gh auth token', { encodin",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/index.js",
"line": 106,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/tools/create-pr.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/create-pr.js:114`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/create-pr.js"
},
"evidence": "const response = await fetch(`https://api.github.com/repos/${owner}/${repo}/git/ref/heads/${branchName}`, {",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/tools/create-pr.js",
"line": 114,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/commands/setup.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/commands/setup.js:83`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/commands/setup.js"
},
"evidence": "cSync } = require('node:child_process'); const result = execSync(`pgrep -f \"${name}\" 2>/dev/null || true`, { enc",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/commands/setup.js",
"line": 83,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "list_open_threads",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_thread_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_pr_for_thread",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mark_thread_addressed",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_deployment_preview",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_thread_message",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"read_message\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_companion_messages",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "reply_to_companion",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ai_analyze_page",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_ai_conversations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pendo_get_feature_usage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pendo_get_page_analytics",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"get_page\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "pendo_track_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pendo_list_guides",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_activity_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_recent_events",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_files_touched",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_dashboard_url",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_source_for_selection",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_element_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_latest_selection",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_selection_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "9e277148c1829966eab3ff3f1c69eb968ca19a53d10fce698eca17592c654488",
"stats": {
"tools": 22,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 3,
"medium": 1,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}