Yocoolab MCP Server
@yocoolab/mcp-server
npm
v2.4.2
Published by @yocoolab — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server that exposes Yocoolab feedback threads, design selections, and activity events as tools for Claude Code and other MCP-compatible clients.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/hook-installer.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/hook-installer.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "node:os")); const node_child_process_1 = require("node:child_process"); const HOOK_SCRIPT = node_path_1.default.resolve
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/hook-installer.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/http-bridge.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/http-bridge.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ode:path")); const node_child_process_1 = require("node:child_process"); const uuid_1 = require("uuid"); const activity_
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/http-bridge.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:106`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } = require('child_process'); const ghToken = execSync('gh auth token', { encodin
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/tools/create-pr.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/create-pr.js:114`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch(`https://api.github.com/repos/${owner}/${repo}/git/ref/heads/${branchName}`, {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/create-pr.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/commands/setup.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/commands/setup.js:83`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cSync } = require('node:child_process'); const result = execSync(`pgrep -f "${name}" 2>/dev/null || true`, { enc
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/commands/setup.js
Tools 22
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
add_thread_messageingests untrusted inputpendo_get_page_analyticsingests untrusted inputai_analyze_pageno sensitive capabilitycreate_pr_for_threadno sensitive capabilityfind_source_for_selectionno sensitive capabilityget_activity_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_ai_conversationsno sensitive capabilityget_companion_messagesno sensitive capabilityget_dashboard_urlno sensitive capabilityget_deployment_previewno sensitive capability
Show 12 more tools ↓
get_element_contextno sensitive capabilityget_files_touchedno sensitive capabilityget_latest_selectionno sensitive capabilityget_recent_eventsno sensitive capabilityget_selection_historyno sensitive capabilityget_thread_contextno sensitive capabilitylist_open_threadsno sensitive capabilitymark_thread_addressedno sensitive capabilitypendo_get_feature_usageno sensitive capabilitypendo_list_guidesno sensitive capabilitypendo_track_eventno sensitive capabilityreply_to_companionno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (22 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.4.2 latest |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v2.4.1 |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-05 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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