Twitterapi — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@yilin-jing/twitterapi-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@yilin-jing/twitterapi-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "@yilin-jing/twitterapi-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (11 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-004",
"title": "Sensitive-source and external-sink co-exist",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tools that read sensitive data ([login_user]) and tools that can send data out ([create_tweet]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.",
"remediation": "Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "login_user → create_tweet"
},
"evidence": "sources [login_user] → sinks [create_tweet]",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"sources": [
"login_user"
],
"sinks": [
"create_tweet"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-007",
"title": "Unconstrained URL/host parameter \"attachment_url\" on \"create_tweet\"",
"category": "network",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"create_tweet\" takes a URL/host parameter \"attachment_url\" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).",
"remediation": "Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "create_tweet",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.attachment_url"
},
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"data": {
"param": "attachment_url"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [],
"sensitiveSource": [
"login_user"
],
"externalSink": [
"create_tweet"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"login_user",
"create_tweet"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A sensitive-source → external-sink chain exists: login_user → create_tweet."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "get_user_by_username",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_user_by_id",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_user_tweets",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_tweets",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_tweet_by_id",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_tweet_replies",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_user_followers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_user_following",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_users",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "login_user",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"secret\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "create_tweet",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"tweet\""
]
}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "b564bfde0f101d0a9d86de76cdabb842e4b0b6d13d3bdbf08b94a6c3f45f1036",
"stats": {
"tools": 11,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 1,
"medium": 1,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}