Twitterapi (yilin-jing) MCP Server
@yilin-jing/twitterapi-mcp
npm
v1.2.0
Published by @yilin-jing — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for TwitterAPI.io - Access Twitter data through a unified API interface with TOON format for 90%+ token savings
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([login_user]) and tools that can send data out ([create_tweet]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [login_user] → sinks [create_tweet]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow login_user → create_tweet
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "attachment_url" on "create_tweet"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "create_tweet" takes a URL/host parameter "attachment_url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool create_tweet · inputSchema.properties.attachment_url
Tools 11
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_tweetnetwork egresslogin_userreads sensitive dataget_tweet_by_idno sensitive capabilityget_tweet_repliesno sensitive capabilityget_user_by_idno sensitive capabilityget_user_by_usernameno sensitive capabilityget_user_followersno sensitive capabilityget_user_followingno sensitive capabilityget_user_tweetsno sensitive capabilitysearch_tweetsno sensitive capability
Show 1 more tool ↓
search_usersno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (11 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.2.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @yilin-jing/twitterapi-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Twitterapi 3
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 4 side by side →
MCP server for TwitterAPI.io - Access Twitter data through a unified API interface
MCP server for fetching tweets from a specific X (Twitter) user via twitterapi.io.
MCP server for TwitterAPI.io - Access Twitter data through a unified API interface
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