Meta Ads Mcp Fixed — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@xcelerate_digital_systems/meta-ads-mcp-fixed",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@xcelerate_digital_systems/meta-ads-mcp-fixed"
},
"server": {
"name": "@xcelerate_digital_systems/meta-ads-mcp-fixed"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (57 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (build/src/meta-client.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/src/meta-client.js:508`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/src/meta-client.js"
},
"evidence": "uploadResponse = await fetch(`https://graph.facebook.com/v23.0/${formattedAccountId}/adimages`, { metho",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "build/src/meta-client.js",
"line": 508,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (build/src/utils/user-auth.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/src/utils/user-auth.js:308`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/src/utils/user-auth.js"
},
"evidence": "const response = await fetch(`https://graph.facebook.com/v23.0/oauth/access_token`, { method: 'POST',",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "build/src/utils/user-auth.js",
"line": 308,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/meta-client.ts)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/meta-client.ts:922`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/meta-client.ts"
},
"evidence": "uploadResponse = await fetch( `https://graph.facebook.com/v23.0/${formattedAccountId}/adimages`, {",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "src/meta-client.ts",
"line": 922,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/utils/user-auth.ts)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/utils/user-auth.ts:369`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/utils/user-auth.ts"
},
"evidence": "const response = await fetch( `https://graph.facebook.com/v23.0/oauth/access_token`, { method: 'POS",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "src/utils/user-auth.ts",
"line": 369,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (test-api.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`test-api.js:30`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "test-api.js"
},
"evidence": "onst meResponse = await fetch( `https://graph.facebook.com/v23.0/me?access_token=${token}` ); const meData",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "test-api.js",
"line": 30,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/health-check.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/health-check.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/health-check.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execSync } from \"child_process\"; import fs from \"fs\"; import path from \"path\"; import os from \"os\"; function get",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/health-check.js",
"line": 3,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/setup-mcp.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/setup-mcp.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/setup-mcp.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execSync } from \"child_process\"; import readline from \"readline\"; const rl = readline.createInterface({ input:",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/setup-mcp.js",
"line": 6,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "health_check",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_ad_accounts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_campaigns",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_insights",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_campaign",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_campaign",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pause_campaign",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "resume_campaign",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_ad_set",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_ad_sets",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_ad",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_ads",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compare_performance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "export_insights",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_audiences",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_custom_audience",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_lookalike_audience",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_audience_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_ad_creatives",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_ad_creative",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_account_setup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "diagnose_campaign_readiness",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "upload_image_from_url",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_api_v23_compliance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_token_info",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"get_token\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_capabilities",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_ai_guidance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_campaign_performance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_attribution_data",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_campaigns",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_campaign",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_campaign_readiness",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_ad_set_enhanced",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_campaign",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_campaign_ad_sets",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_meta_api_reference",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_quick_fixes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "verify_account_setup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_creatives",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "validate_creative_setup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "preview_ad",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "upload_creative_asset",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "setup_ab_test",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_creative_performance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_creative",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_creative",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "validate_creative_enhanced",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_creative_best_practices",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "troubleshoot_creative_issues",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_account_creatives",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_meta_error_codes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_auth_url",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "exchange_code_for_token",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "refresh_to_long_lived_token",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_system_user_token",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "validate_token",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "bb38ce81c5a1edea080161ed1ebb966a5f13b3a874ae8a9f871c279acf60467f",
"stats": {
"tools": 57,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 0,
"medium": 5,
"low": 2,
"info": 0
}
}
}