Meta Ads Mcp Fixed MCP Server
@xcelerate_digital_systems/meta-ads-mcp-fixed
npm
v1.0.5
Published by @xcelerate_digital_systems — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Meta Marketing API MCP Server with fixed insights for lead generation and cost per lead analysis
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (build/src/meta-client.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`build/src/meta-client.js:508`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: uploadResponse = await fetch(`https://graph.facebook.com/v23.0/${formattedAccountId}/adimages`, { metho
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/src/meta-client.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (build/src/utils/user-auth.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`build/src/utils/user-auth.js:308`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch(`https://graph.facebook.com/v23.0/oauth/access_token`, { method: 'POST',
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/src/utils/user-auth.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/meta-client.ts)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`src/meta-client.ts:922`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: uploadResponse = await fetch( `https://graph.facebook.com/v23.0/${formattedAccountId}/adimages`, {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/meta-client.ts
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/utils/user-auth.ts)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`src/utils/user-auth.ts:369`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch( `https://graph.facebook.com/v23.0/oauth/access_token`, { method: 'POS
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/utils/user-auth.ts
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (test-api.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`test-api.js:30`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: onst meResponse = await fetch( `https://graph.facebook.com/v23.0/me?access_token=${token}` ); const meData
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server test-api.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/health-check.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/health-check.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import fs from "fs"; import path from "path"; import os from "os"; function get
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/health-check.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/setup-mcp.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/setup-mcp.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import readline from "readline"; const rl = readline.createInterface({ input:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/setup-mcp.js
Tools 57
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_token_inforeads sensitive dataaddno sensitive capabilityanalyze_account_creativesno sensitive capabilitycheck_account_setupno sensitive capabilitycheck_api_v23_complianceno sensitive capabilitycheck_campaign_readinessno sensitive capabilitycompare_performanceno sensitive capabilitycreate_adno sensitive capabilitycreate_ad_creativeno sensitive capabilitycreate_ad_setno sensitive capability
Show 47 more tools ↓
create_ad_set_enhancedno sensitive capabilitycreate_campaignno sensitive capabilitycreate_custom_audienceno sensitive capabilitycreate_lookalike_audienceno sensitive capabilitydelete_campaignno sensitive capabilitydelete_creativeno sensitive capabilitydiagnose_campaign_readinessno sensitive capabilityexchange_code_for_tokenno sensitive capabilityexport_insightsno sensitive capabilitygenerate_auth_urlno sensitive capabilitygenerate_system_user_tokenno sensitive capabilityget_ad_accountsno sensitive capabilityget_ai_guidanceno sensitive capabilityget_attribution_datano sensitive capabilityget_audience_infono sensitive capabilityget_campaignno sensitive capabilityget_campaign_performanceno sensitive capabilityget_campaignsno sensitive capabilityget_capabilitiesno sensitive capabilityget_creative_best_practicesno sensitive capabilityget_creative_performanceno sensitive capabilityget_insightsno sensitive capabilityget_meta_api_referenceno sensitive capabilityget_meta_error_codesno sensitive capabilityget_quick_fixesno sensitive capabilityhealth_checkno sensitive capabilitylist_ad_creativesno sensitive capabilitylist_ad_setsno sensitive capabilitylist_adsno sensitive capabilitylist_audiencesno sensitive capabilitylist_campaign_ad_setsno sensitive capabilitylist_campaignsno sensitive capabilitylist_creativesno sensitive capabilitypause_campaignno sensitive capabilitypreview_adno sensitive capabilityrefresh_to_long_lived_tokenno sensitive capabilityresume_campaignno sensitive capabilitysetup_ab_testno sensitive capabilitytroubleshoot_creative_issuesno sensitive capabilityupdate_campaignno sensitive capabilityupdate_creativeno sensitive capabilityupload_creative_assetno sensitive capabilityupload_image_from_urlno sensitive capabilityvalidate_creative_enhancedno sensitive capabilityvalidate_creative_setupno sensitive capabilityvalidate_tokenno sensitive capabilityverify_account_setupno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (57 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.5 latest |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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