Wyrm MCP Server
wyrm-mcp
npm
v9.1.2
Published by ghosts-protocol-pvt-ltd — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Local-first persistent memory for AI agents over MCP. Ground truths, negative learning (recorded failures block repeats), decision causality, hybrid recall, live memory streams, run-attributed fleet memory — a structured SQLite memory on your machine, no
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 7 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 15
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/wyrm-cli.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`dist/wyrm-cli.js:204`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ath")).join(e.homedir(),".npmrc");if(!r.existsSync(t)){f("~/.npmrc not found"),process.exitCode=1;return}const n=r.readF
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/wyrm-cli.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/agent-daemon.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/agent-daemon.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import{spawn as E}from"child_process";import{existsSync as l,readFileSync as g,writeFileSync as I,statSync as w,openSyn
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/agent-daemon.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/autoconfig.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/autoconfig.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort{spawnSync as w}from"child_process";function te(){const e=h(),t=b(),o=t==="darwin"?a(e,"Library","Application Support
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/autoconfig.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cloud-sync.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cloud-sync.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import{spawn as D}from"child_process";import{existsSync as a,readFileSync as p,writeFileSync as k,statSync as g,mkdirSy
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cloud-sync.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cloud/sync-daemon-entrypoint.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cloud/sync-daemon-entrypoint.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import{spawn as a}from"child_process";import{fileURLToPath as l}from"url";import{dirname as m,join as p}from"path";impo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cloud/sync-daemon-entrypoint.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cloud/sync-daemon.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cloud/sync-daemon.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import{spawn as g}from"child_process";import{existsSync as o,readFileSync as d,writeFileSync as y,mkdirSync as E,openSy
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cloud/sync-daemon.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/database.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/database.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort{spawnSync as T}from"child_process";import{getResilienceManager as H}from"./resilience.js";import{WyrmLogger as F}fro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/database.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/handlers/cloud.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/handlers/cloud.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execFile as b}from"node:child_process";import{promisify as _}from"node:util";import{fileURLToPath as $}from"node:url";im
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/handlers/cloud.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/handlers/companion.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/handlers/companion.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ;import{spawn as _}from"child_process";const R=[{name:"wyrm_inject_prompt",description:"Opt-in: inject a Wyrm session-pr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/handlers/companion.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/harvest.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/harvest.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: {execFileSync as m}from"child_process";import{readFileSync as h,existsSync as g}from"fs";import{join as u}from"path";imp
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/harvest.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/mcp-client.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp-client.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import{spawn as f}from"child_process";import{McpIntegrity as h}from"./mcp-integrity.js";const g=300*1e3,E=10,m=3e4;clas
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp-client.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/providers/embedding-provider.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/providers/embedding-provider.js:1`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: embed(e){const t=await fetch("https://api.openai.com/v1/embeddings",{method:"POST",headers:{Authorization:`Bearer ${thi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/providers/embedding-provider.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/sub-agent.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/sub-agent.js:35`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ,l,u){try{const c=await fetch("https://api.openai.com/v1/chat/completions",{method:"POST",headers:{"Content-Type":"appli
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/sub-agent.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/wyrm-cli.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/wyrm-cli.js:76`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const{evaluate:e}=await import(s),{WyrmDB:o}=await import("./database.js"),{MemoryArtifacts:t}=await import("./memory-ar
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/wyrm-cli.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (preinstall, postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"wyrm-mcp" executes preinstall/postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node scripts/preinstall.cjs ; node scripts/postinstall.cjs
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package wyrm-mcp
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 10
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v9.1.2 latest |
A 92/100 | 15 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v9.1.0 |
A 92/100 | 15 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-04 |
v8.7.6 |
A 92/100 | 15 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v8.7.3 |
A 92/100 | 15 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-19 |
v8.7.2 |
A 92/100 | 15 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-18 |
Show 5 more versions ↓
v8.7.1 |
A 92/100 | 15 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-17 |
v8.6.1 |
A 92/100 | 15 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-16 |
v8.5.8 |
A 92/100 | 15 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-12 |
v8.5.5 |
C 71/100 | 15 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
v8.5.4 |
C 71/100 | 15 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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