Markdown Vault MCP Server
@wirux/mcp-markdown-vault
npm
v2.3.0
Source verified
Published by wirux — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Every server starts at 100. These are the exact deductions the deterministic engine applied — each one reproducible, none of it an opinion or an LLM's guess:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −12.3 | Unsafe deserialization ×5 MTC-SRC-007 | permissions |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind the deduction.
Findings 5
medium Unsafe deserialization (dist/infrastructure/markdown-file-repository.js)MTC-SRC-007
In the server's implementation (`dist/infrastructure/markdown-file-repository.js:25`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: yaml.load(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/infrastructure/markdown-file-repository.js
medium Unsafe deserialization (dist/presentation/mcp-tools.js)MTC-SRC-007
In the server's implementation (`dist/presentation/mcp-tools.js:294`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: yaml.load(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/presentation/mcp-tools.js
medium Unsafe deserialization (dist/use-cases/batch-edit.js)MTC-SRC-007
In the server's implementation (`dist/use-cases/batch-edit.js:111`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: yaml.load(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/use-cases/batch-edit.js
medium Unsafe deserialization (dist/use-cases/overview-manager.js)MTC-SRC-007
In the server's implementation (`dist/use-cases/overview-manager.js:144`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: yaml.load(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/use-cases/overview-manager.js
medium Unsafe deserialization (dist/use-cases/vault-scope.js)MTC-SRC-007
In the server's implementation (`dist/use-cases/vault-scope.js:28`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: yaml.load(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/use-cases/vault-scope.js
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.3.0 latest |
B 88/100 | 5 | 1.5.0 | 2026-07-22 |
Embed this score
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Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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