Wireshark — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "wireshark-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "wireshark-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "wireshark-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 96,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "moderate",
"label": "capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "moderate",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (34 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (homebrew/.github/scripts/generate_formula.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`homebrew/.github/scripts/generate_formula.py:89`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "homebrew/.github/scripts/generate_formula.py"
},
"evidence": "dir, \"bin\", \"pip\") subprocess.run( [pip, \"install\", \"--quiet\", f\"wireshark-mcp=={version}\"], check=",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "homebrew/.github/scripts/generate_formula.py",
"line": 89,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/benchmark_analysis_paths.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/benchmark_analysis_paths.py:96`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/benchmark_analysis_paths.py"
},
"evidence": "te=d\"]) completed = subprocess.run(command, capture_output=True, text=True, check=False) if completed.returncode",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/benchmark_analysis_paths.py",
"line": 96,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_field_names.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_field_names.py:43`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_field_names.py"
},
"evidence": "fter `-e`.\"\"\" out = subprocess.run([\"tshark\", \"-G\", \"fields\"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=120).stdout",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_field_names.py",
"line": 43,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_prompt_cache.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_prompt_cache.py:78`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_prompt_cache.py"
},
"evidence": "] = seed proc = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, \"-c\", script], cwd=REPO_ROOT,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_prompt_cache.py",
"line": 78,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_server.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_server.py:506`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_server.py"
},
"evidence": "s.close() proc = subprocess.Popen( [ sys.executable, \"-m\", \"wireshark",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_server.py",
"line": 506,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_skill_distribution.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_skill_distribution.py:51`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_skill_distribution.py"
},
"evidence": "import sys res = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, str(ROOT / \"scripts\" / \"sync_skills.py\"), \"--check\"],",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_skill_distribution.py",
"line": 51,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"wireshark-mcp\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "wireshark-mcp"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "wireshark_decode_as",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wireshark_set_protocol_prefs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wireshark_decrypt_tls",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wireshark_decrypt_wpa",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wireshark_extract_frames",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wireshark_flow_graph",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wireshark_quick_analysis",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wireshark_get_packet_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wireshark_get_packet_details",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wireshark_get_packet_bytes",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"dump\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "wireshark_get_packet_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wireshark_read_packets",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wireshark_extract_fields",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wireshark_search_packets",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wireshark_follow_stream",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wireshark_open_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wireshark_aggregate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wireshark_stats_protocol_hierarchy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wireshark_stats_endpoints",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wireshark_stats_conversations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wireshark_stats_io_graph",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wireshark_stats_expert_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wireshark_stats_service_response_time",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wireshark_get_capabilities",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wireshark_get_file_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wireshark_merge_pcaps",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wireshark_text2pcap_import",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wireshark_list_interfaces",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wireshark_capture",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wireshark_filter_save",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wireshark_editcap_trim",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wireshark_editcap_split",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wireshark_editcap_time_shift",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wireshark_editcap_deduplicate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "37e22a6789a653cc0dfacd7999c22f56f8da277f6289da04d4f319aca81e6989",
"stats": {
"tools": 34,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 0,
"medium": 0,
"low": 6,
"info": 1
}
}
}