Wireshark MCP Server
wireshark-mcp
PyPI
v3.0.0
Published by bx33661 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
A production-grade Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Wireshark
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (homebrew/.github/scripts/generate_formula.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`homebrew/.github/scripts/generate_formula.py:89`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: dir, "bin", "pip") subprocess.run( [pip, "install", "--quiet", f"wireshark-mcp=={version}"], check=
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server homebrew/.github/scripts/generate_formula.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/benchmark_analysis_paths.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/benchmark_analysis_paths.py:96`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: te=d"]) completed = subprocess.run(command, capture_output=True, text=True, check=False) if completed.returncode
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/benchmark_analysis_paths.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_field_names.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_field_names.py:43`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: fter `-e`.""" out = subprocess.run(["tshark", "-G", "fields"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=120).stdout
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_field_names.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_prompt_cache.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_prompt_cache.py:78`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ] = seed proc = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-c", script], cwd=REPO_ROOT,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_prompt_cache.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_server.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_server.py:506`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: s.close() proc = subprocess.Popen( [ sys.executable, "-m", "wireshark
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_server.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_skill_distribution.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_skill_distribution.py:51`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import sys res = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, str(ROOT / "scripts" / "sync_skills.py"), "--check"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_skill_distribution.py
Tools 34
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
wireshark_get_packet_bytesreads sensitive datawireshark_aggregateno sensitive capabilitywireshark_captureno sensitive capabilitywireshark_decode_asno sensitive capabilitywireshark_decrypt_tlsno sensitive capabilitywireshark_decrypt_wpano sensitive capabilitywireshark_editcap_deduplicateno sensitive capabilitywireshark_editcap_splitno sensitive capabilitywireshark_editcap_time_shiftno sensitive capabilitywireshark_editcap_trimno sensitive capability
Show 24 more tools ↓
wireshark_extract_fieldsno sensitive capabilitywireshark_extract_framesno sensitive capabilitywireshark_filter_saveno sensitive capabilitywireshark_flow_graphno sensitive capabilitywireshark_follow_streamno sensitive capabilitywireshark_get_capabilitiesno sensitive capabilitywireshark_get_file_infono sensitive capabilitywireshark_get_packet_contextno sensitive capabilitywireshark_get_packet_detailsno sensitive capabilitywireshark_get_packet_listno sensitive capabilitywireshark_list_interfacesno sensitive capabilitywireshark_merge_pcapsno sensitive capabilitywireshark_open_fileno sensitive capabilitywireshark_quick_analysisno sensitive capabilitywireshark_read_packetsno sensitive capabilitywireshark_search_packetsno sensitive capabilitywireshark_set_protocol_prefsno sensitive capabilitywireshark_stats_conversationsno sensitive capabilitywireshark_stats_endpointsno sensitive capabilitywireshark_stats_expert_infono sensitive capabilitywireshark_stats_io_graphno sensitive capabilitywireshark_stats_protocol_hierarchyno sensitive capabilitywireshark_stats_service_response_timeno sensitive capabilitywireshark_text2pcap_importno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (34 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v3.0.0 latest |
A 96/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-06 |
v2.0.0 |
A 96/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v1.1.5 |
A 93/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan wireshark-mcp --online --registry pypiMore in Developer Tools
Hotel booking MCP server — 300K+ properties, real confirmation numbers, loyalty programs. Builders monetize every booking via Stripe Connect. The first MCP server that completes real hotel reservations inside AI conversations.
Manage AdGuard Home through AI assistants
Read-only Azure DevOps for MCP clients using only your existing browser session — no PAT, no Azure CLI. Browse work items, pull requests, comments, attachments and Artifacts feeds across every project, repo and feed you can access.
MCP server for Adobe Experience Manager Assets integration development
Servidor MCP para el tiempo oficial de España (API pública OpenData de AEMET). Predicción, observación y avisos como herramientas MCP tipadas.
A standalone MCP stdio bridge for Affinity by Canva's local MCP SSE server.