Winforensics — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "winforensics-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "winforensics-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "winforensics-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 88,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "none",
"label": "publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read",
"appliedPenalty": 2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"external-sink",
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (61 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: api_search_category → evtx_list_files → pcap_get_http. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "api_search_category → evtx_list_files → pcap_get_http"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"api_search_category",
"user_parse_shellbags"
],
"sources": [
"evtx_list_files"
],
"sinks": [
"pcap_get_http"
],
"path": [
"api_search_category",
"evtx_list_files",
"pcap_get_http"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "api_search_category",
"to": "evtx_list_files",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "evtx_list_files",
"to": "pcap_get_http",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
}
],
"wired": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (winforensics_mcp/parsers/die_analyzer.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`winforensics_mcp/parsers/die_analyzer.py:72`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "winforensics_mcp/parsers/die_analyzer.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( [_DIEC_PATH, \"--version\"], capture_output=True,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "winforensics_mcp/parsers/die_analyzer.py",
"line": 72,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-007",
"title": "Unconstrained URL/host parameter \"url_filter\" on \"pcap_get_http\"",
"category": "network",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"pcap_get_http\" takes a URL/host parameter \"url_filter\" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).",
"remediation": "Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "pcap_get_http",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.url_filter"
},
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"data": {
"param": "url_filter"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"directory\" on \"evtx_list_files\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"evtx_list_files\" takes a path parameter \"directory\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "evtx_list_files",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.directory"
},
"data": {
"param": "directory"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package declares no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"winforensics-mcp\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "winforensics-mcp"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"api_search_category",
"user_parse_shellbags"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"evtx_list_files"
],
"externalSink": [
"pcap_get_http"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"api_search_category",
"evtx_list_files",
"pcap_get_http"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: api_search_category → evtx_list_files → pcap_get_http."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "evtx_list_files",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"list_files\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "evtx_get_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "evtx_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "evtx_security_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "evtx_attack_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "evtx_explain_event_id",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "registry_get_key",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "registry_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "registry_get_persistence",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "registry_get_users",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "registry_get_usb_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "registry_get_system_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "registry_get_network",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "forensics_list_important_events",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "forensics_list_registry_keys",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "file_analyze_pe",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "yara_scan_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "yara_scan_directory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "yara_list_rules",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vt_lookup_hash",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vt_lookup_ip",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vt_lookup_domain",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vt_lookup_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pcap_get_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pcap_get_conversations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pcap_get_dns",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pcap_get_http",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"http_request\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "pcap_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pcap_find_suspicious",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "die_analyze_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "die_scan_directory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "die_get_packer_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "api_analyze_imports",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "api_lookup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "api_search_category",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"browse\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "api_detect_patterns",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "apmx_parse",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "apmx_get_calls",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "apmx_detect_patterns",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "apmx_get_call_details",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "apmx_correlate_handles",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "apmx_injection_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "apmx_calls_around",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "apmx_search_params",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "disk_parse_prefetch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "disk_parse_amcache",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "disk_parse_srum",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "investigate_execution",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "build_timeline",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hunt_ioc",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ioc_pack_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hunt_ioc_pack",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "investigate_user_activity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ingest_parsed_csv",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "disk_parse_mft",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "disk_parse_usn_journal",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_get_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "user_parse_lnk_files",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "user_parse_shellbags",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"browse\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "remote_collect_artifacts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "remote_get_system_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "f330b5fb826007bcdc780b04a97cf9f1172cbd592bd092dd01394897e50e06a8",
"stats": {
"tools": 61,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 1,
"high": 1,
"medium": 1,
"low": 1,
"info": 1
}
}
}