winforensics-mcp
PyPI
v1.4.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 5.1 = 95. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −2.1 | Package has no source repository MTC-SUP-011 | supply-chain |
| −1.8 | Authority framing in tool metadata ×2 MTC-INJ-AUTH-1 | injection |
| −1.2 | Excessive ALL-CAPS emphasis in metadata MTC-INJ-CAPS | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 95 − 15 = 80. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −5 | publisher verification (unlocatable) — no provenance and no public repository to inspect |
| ✓ | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: api_search_category → api_analyze_imports → browser_get_history. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow api_search_category → api_analyze_imports → browser_get_history
Tool "pcap_get_http" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.
Fix: Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.
Location: flow pcap_get_http
Tool "browser_get_history" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.
Fix: Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.
Location: flow browser_get_history
In the server's implementation (`parsers/die_analyzer.py:72`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server parsers/die_analyzer.py
Tool "pcap_get_http" takes a URL/host parameter "url_filter" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool pcap_get_http · inputSchema.properties.url_filter
Tool "browser_get_history" takes a URL/host parameter "url_filter" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool browser_get_history · inputSchema.properties.url_filter
Authority framing in tool metadata detected in the description of tool "forensics_list_important_events". Instruction-like content in tool metadata is executed by the model, not the human, and is the primary tool-poisoning vector.
Evidence: important
Fix: Tool descriptions should describe behavior, not instruct the assistant. Treat imperative / secrecy / sequencing language in metadata as hostile.
Location: tool forensics_list_important_events · description
Authority framing in tool metadata detected in the description of tool "forensics_list_registry_keys". Instruction-like content in tool metadata is executed by the model, not the human, and is the primary tool-poisoning vector.
Evidence: important
Fix: Tool descriptions should describe behavior, not instruct the assistant. Treat imperative / secrecy / sequencing language in metadata as hostile.
Location: tool forensics_list_registry_keys · description
A run of shouted words is a common way to give injected instructions false authority.
Evidence: Hunt for IOC (hash, filename, IP, domain) across all forensic artifacts. Searches Prefetch, Amcache, SRUM, MFT, USN Jour
Location: tool hunt_ioc · description
Tool "evtx_list_files" takes a path parameter "directory" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool evtx_list_files · inputSchema.properties.directory
Tool "evtx_get_stats" takes a path parameter "evtx_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool evtx_get_stats · inputSchema.properties.evtx_path
Tool "evtx_search" takes a path parameter "evtx_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool evtx_search · inputSchema.properties.evtx_path
Tool "evtx_security_search" takes a path parameter "evtx_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool evtx_security_search · inputSchema.properties.evtx_path
Tool "evtx_attack_summary" takes a path parameter "evtx_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool evtx_attack_summary · inputSchema.properties.evtx_path
Tool "registry_get_key" takes a path parameter "hive_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool registry_get_key · inputSchema.properties.hive_path
Tool "registry_get_key" takes a path parameter "key_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool registry_get_key · inputSchema.properties.key_path
Tool "registry_search" takes a path parameter "hive_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool registry_search · inputSchema.properties.hive_path
Tool "registry_get_users" takes a path parameter "sam_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool registry_get_users · inputSchema.properties.sam_path
Tool "file_analyze_pe" takes a path parameter "file_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool file_analyze_pe · inputSchema.properties.file_path
Tool "yara_scan_file" takes a path parameter "file_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool yara_scan_file · inputSchema.properties.file_path
Tool "vt_lookup_file" takes a path parameter "file_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool vt_lookup_file · inputSchema.properties.file_path
Tool "pcap_get_stats" takes a path parameter "pcap_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool pcap_get_stats · inputSchema.properties.pcap_path
Tool "pcap_get_conversations" takes a path parameter "pcap_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool pcap_get_conversations · inputSchema.properties.pcap_path
Tool "pcap_get_dns" takes a path parameter "pcap_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool pcap_get_dns · inputSchema.properties.pcap_path
Tool "pcap_get_http" takes a path parameter "pcap_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool pcap_get_http · inputSchema.properties.pcap_path
Tool "pcap_search" takes a path parameter "pcap_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool pcap_search · inputSchema.properties.pcap_path
Tool "pcap_find_suspicious" takes a path parameter "pcap_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool pcap_find_suspicious · inputSchema.properties.pcap_path
Tool "die_analyze_file" takes a path parameter "file_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool die_analyze_file · inputSchema.properties.file_path
Tool "die_scan_directory" takes a path parameter "dir_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool die_scan_directory · inputSchema.properties.dir_path
Tool "api_analyze_imports" takes a path parameter "file_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool api_analyze_imports · inputSchema.properties.file_path
Tool "api_detect_patterns" takes a path parameter "file_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool api_detect_patterns · inputSchema.properties.file_path
Tool "apmx_parse" takes a path parameter "file_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool apmx_parse · inputSchema.properties.file_path
Tool "apmx_get_calls" takes a path parameter "file_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool apmx_get_calls · inputSchema.properties.file_path
Tool "apmx_detect_patterns" takes a path parameter "file_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool apmx_detect_patterns · inputSchema.properties.file_path
Tool "apmx_get_call_details" takes a path parameter "file_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool apmx_get_call_details · inputSchema.properties.file_path
Tool "apmx_correlate_handles" takes a path parameter "file_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool apmx_correlate_handles · inputSchema.properties.file_path
Tool "apmx_injection_info" takes a path parameter "file_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool apmx_injection_info · inputSchema.properties.file_path
Tool "apmx_calls_around" takes a path parameter "file_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool apmx_calls_around · inputSchema.properties.file_path
Tool "apmx_search_params" takes a path parameter "file_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool apmx_search_params · inputSchema.properties.file_path
Tool "disk_parse_prefetch" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool disk_parse_prefetch · inputSchema.properties.path
Tool "disk_parse_amcache" takes a path parameter "amcache_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool disk_parse_amcache · inputSchema.properties.amcache_path
Tool "disk_parse_amcache" takes a path parameter "path_filter" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool disk_parse_amcache · inputSchema.properties.path_filter
Tool "disk_parse_srum" takes a path parameter "srum_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool disk_parse_srum · inputSchema.properties.srum_path
Tool "investigate_execution" takes a path parameter "artifacts_dir" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool investigate_execution · inputSchema.properties.artifacts_dir
Tool "investigate_execution" takes a path parameter "prefetch_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool investigate_execution · inputSchema.properties.prefetch_path
Tool "investigate_execution" takes a path parameter "amcache_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool investigate_execution · inputSchema.properties.amcache_path
Tool "investigate_execution" takes a path parameter "srum_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool investigate_execution · inputSchema.properties.srum_path
Tool "build_timeline" takes a path parameter "artifacts_dir" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool build_timeline · inputSchema.properties.artifacts_dir
Tool "build_timeline" takes a path parameter "mft_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool build_timeline · inputSchema.properties.mft_path
Tool "build_timeline" takes a path parameter "usn_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool build_timeline · inputSchema.properties.usn_path
Tool "build_timeline" takes a path parameter "prefetch_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool build_timeline · inputSchema.properties.prefetch_path
Tool "build_timeline" takes a path parameter "amcache_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool build_timeline · inputSchema.properties.amcache_path
Tool "build_timeline" takes a path parameter "evtx_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool build_timeline · inputSchema.properties.evtx_path
Tool "hunt_ioc_pack" takes a path parameter "artifacts_dir" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool hunt_ioc_pack · inputSchema.properties.artifacts_dir
Tool "hunt_ioc_pack" takes a path parameter "pack_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool hunt_ioc_pack · inputSchema.properties.pack_path
Tool "hunt_ioc_pack" takes a path parameter "max_file_size" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool hunt_ioc_pack · inputSchema.properties.max_file_size
Tool "investigate_user_activity" takes a path parameter "artifacts_dir" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool investigate_user_activity · inputSchema.properties.artifacts_dir
Tool "investigate_user_activity" takes a path parameter "browser_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool investigate_user_activity · inputSchema.properties.browser_path
Tool "investigate_user_activity" takes a path parameter "lnk_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool investigate_user_activity · inputSchema.properties.lnk_path
Tool "investigate_user_activity" takes a path parameter "usrclass_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool investigate_user_activity · inputSchema.properties.usrclass_path
Tool "investigate_user_activity" takes a path parameter "ntuser_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool investigate_user_activity · inputSchema.properties.ntuser_path
Tool "ingest_parsed_csv" takes a path parameter "csv_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool ingest_parsed_csv · inputSchema.properties.csv_path
Tool "disk_parse_usn_journal" takes a path parameter "usn_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool disk_parse_usn_journal · inputSchema.properties.usn_path
Tool "disk_parse_usn_journal" takes a path parameter "filename_filter" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool disk_parse_usn_journal · inputSchema.properties.filename_filter
Tool "browser_get_history" takes a path parameter "history_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool browser_get_history · inputSchema.properties.history_path
Tool "user_parse_lnk_files" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool user_parse_lnk_files · inputSchema.properties.path
Tool "user_parse_shellbags" takes a path parameter "usrclass_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool user_parse_shellbags · inputSchema.properties.usrclass_path
Tool "user_parse_shellbags" takes a path parameter "path_filter" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool user_parse_shellbags · inputSchema.properties.path_filter
"winforensics-mcp" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.
Fix: Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.
Location: package winforensics-mcp
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.4.0 latest |
B 80/100 | 69 | 1.7.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan winforensics-mcp --online --registry pypi
Security scan results for the Agentmail MCP server.
Security scan results for the Alfahq MCP server.
Security scan results for the Alpine MCP server.
Security scan results for the Atag MCP server.
Security scan results for the Aurais Mcp Research Reader MCP server.
Security scan results for the Bookstack MCP server.