Winforensics MCP Server
winforensics-mcp
PyPI
v1.4.1
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Windows Forensics MCP Server - EVTX parsing, Registry analysis, PE analysis, API Monitor knowledge base, and remote artifact collection for DFIR
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 12 = 88. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: api_search_category → evtx_list_files → pcap_get_http. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow api_search_category → evtx_list_files → pcap_get_http
high Shell/command execution in server code (winforensics_mcp/parsers/die_analyzer.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`winforensics_mcp/parsers/die_analyzer.py:72`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( [_DIEC_PATH, "--version"], capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server winforensics_mcp/parsers/die_analyzer.py
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url_filter" on "pcap_get_http"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "pcap_get_http" takes a URL/host parameter "url_filter" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool pcap_get_http · inputSchema.properties.url_filter
low Unconstrained path parameter "directory" on "evtx_list_files"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "evtx_list_files" takes a path parameter "directory" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool evtx_list_files · inputSchema.properties.directory
Tools 61
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
api_search_categoryingests untrusted inputevtx_list_filesreads sensitive datapcap_get_httpnetwork egressuser_parse_shellbagsingests untrusted inputapi_analyze_importsno sensitive capabilityapi_detect_patternsno sensitive capabilityapi_lookupno sensitive capabilityapmx_calls_aroundno sensitive capabilityapmx_correlate_handlesno sensitive capabilityapmx_detect_patternsno sensitive capability
Show 51 more tools ↓
apmx_get_call_detailsno sensitive capabilityapmx_get_callsno sensitive capabilityapmx_injection_infono sensitive capabilityapmx_parseno sensitive capabilityapmx_search_paramsno sensitive capabilitybrowser_get_historyno sensitive capabilitybuild_timelineno sensitive capabilitydie_analyze_fileno sensitive capabilitydie_get_packer_infono sensitive capabilitydie_scan_directoryno sensitive capabilitydisk_parse_amcacheno sensitive capabilitydisk_parse_mftno sensitive capabilitydisk_parse_prefetchno sensitive capabilitydisk_parse_srumno sensitive capabilitydisk_parse_usn_journalno sensitive capabilityevtx_attack_summaryno sensitive capabilityevtx_explain_event_idno sensitive capabilityevtx_get_statsno sensitive capabilityevtx_searchno sensitive capabilityevtx_security_searchno sensitive capabilityfile_analyze_peno sensitive capabilityforensics_list_important_eventsno sensitive capabilityforensics_list_registry_keysno sensitive capabilityhunt_iocno sensitive capabilityhunt_ioc_packno sensitive capabilityingest_parsed_csvno sensitive capabilityinvestigate_executionno sensitive capabilityinvestigate_user_activityno sensitive capabilityioc_pack_listno sensitive capabilitypcap_find_suspiciousno sensitive capabilitypcap_get_conversationsno sensitive capabilitypcap_get_dnsno sensitive capabilitypcap_get_statsno sensitive capabilitypcap_searchno sensitive capabilityregistry_get_keyno sensitive capabilityregistry_get_networkno sensitive capabilityregistry_get_persistenceno sensitive capabilityregistry_get_system_infono sensitive capabilityregistry_get_usb_historyno sensitive capabilityregistry_get_usersno sensitive capabilityregistry_searchno sensitive capabilityremote_collect_artifactsno sensitive capabilityremote_get_system_infono sensitive capabilityuser_parse_lnk_filesno sensitive capabilityvt_lookup_domainno sensitive capabilityvt_lookup_fileno sensitive capabilityvt_lookup_hashno sensitive capabilityvt_lookup_ipno sensitive capabilityyara_list_rulesno sensitive capabilityyara_scan_directoryno sensitive capabilityyara_scan_fileno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (61 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.4.1 latest |
B 88/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v1.4.0 |
B 88/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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